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ABSTRACT
This essay will examine Iran’s nuclear program and foreign and defense policy and how
these threats shape U.S. defense and foreign policy in the region. Iran’s advanced
nuclear program is only one aspect of its goal to reaching regional hegemony in the
Middle East. Iran looks to establish itself as a dominant power in the region by
employing non-military tools such as promoting Shiism and Iranian ideology and
supporting Arab and non-Arab political leaders and groups friendly toward Iran.
Meanwhile, the United States and other world powers are concerned about Iran’s
enrichment program being diverted to develop nuclear weapons, which may further
destabilize the region. In addition to maintaining an advanced nuclear program, Iran has
also taken courses of action to expand its influence and preserve its interests in the
Middle East by providing direct material support to terrorist groups and developing
military capabilities that threaten the security of the U.S. and its allies in the region.
Because of Iran’s destabilizing role in the region, such as its support of terrorist proxy
groups in Iraq and Syria, and Iran’s development of missile and naval capabilities
directed at countering the defenses of Israel and U.S.-allied Gulf states, the U.S. may
have to modify its Middle East policy that reflects Iran's larger and potentially more
destructive role in the region while also gradually expecting greater burden-sharing from
its regional partners.
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INTRODUCTION

The Islamic Republic of Iran, more commonly referred to as Iran, is a country
with a unique cultural character, a strong national identity, and a relatively youthful,
educated population. These attributes of the Islamic Republic of Iran and its people have
carried over to the belief, within the political and religious Iranian leadership, that Iran is
a regional power who desires to project its influence throughout the Middle East.1
Today, Iran has become a major regional player in the Middle East, as many of the
region’s issues have included Iran’s involvement to some degree. Since 3200 BC, Iran
became the object of repeated interferences by outside tribes and powers, especially in
the 20th century. This has strongly affected Iranian perceptions of the outside world as
unfriendly and hostile. In 1979, the Iranians deposed the Western-backed Shah,
Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, and later fought an eight-year war against Iraq that ended in a
military stalemate and essentially pushed the Islamic Republic towards a defensive
posture to prevent future foreign interventions. In the wake of the 1979 Islamic
Revolution, Iran has attempted to increase its role and influence in the larger Middle East,
e.g., it has supported various Shiite proxy groups throughout the region and pursued a
robust nuclear program as a potential deterrent against foreign intervention. Today, Iran,
under a theocratic government, seeks not only to occupy a rightful spot in its region but
also become the leader of the Islamic world, if not a dominant power in the Middle East.

1

For the purposes of this paper, the Middle East will include: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran, Iraq (with its
autonomous Kurdistan), Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Turkey, United
Arab Emirates, and Yemen.

1

Since the overthrow of the Shah of Iran during the 1979 Revolution, Iran has been
ruled by religious leaders and hard liners on the basis of the revolutionary idea of velayate-faqih.2 Iran’s animosity and distrust toward the United States and the West at large has
been displayed through public statements by the Iranian leadership as well as official
policies that challenge America’s strategic interests in the Middle East, such as ensuring
the security of Israel and U.S. regional allies, protecting the access to regional resources
and freedom of movement of goods and people, and preventing Iran from militarily
dominating the region.
Iran is ethnically and culturally different from most other countries in the Middle
East. The majority of its population is Persian3 and believes in Shia Islam.4 As the only
Shiite state in the region that does not have diplomatic relations with the U.S., Iran has
traditionally attempted to invigorate Shia populations throughout the Middle East to
increase Shia influence from the Levant to the Gulf.5 Iran has also used Shia populations
in the region to develop an Axis of Resistance, which traditionally has included Iran,
Syria, and Hezbollah, to confront U.S. interests.6

2

Velayat-e-faqih is the viewed relationship between Islam and the state, codified by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini,
Iran’s first Supreme Leader, which states there should be no distinction between religion and government in an Islamic
state. Thus, supreme power is handed over to a religious figure and the people must be governed by the “guardianship
of jurisprudent.”
3 According to the CIA World Factbook’s most recent estimate, which can be found at
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ir.html, Iran’s population is between 90 and 95%
Shia.
4 The two main religious camps in the Muslim world are Sunni and Shia Islam. The distinction between the two
religions originates from a dispute of who is to succeed the Prophet Mohammed as the leader of the Muslim world after
his death in 632. One group of followers, which became known as Shias, believed political succession should be based
on Mohammed’s bloodline, while another group called Sunnis opposed the view that an Imam (a Muslim religious
leader) must be blood relatives of the Prophet.
5
This paper will define the Levant as Jordan, Lebanon, Palestine, and Syria; and the Gulf states will include Bahrain,
Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates.
6 Sullivan, Marisa. “Hezbollah in Syria.” Middle East Security Report 19. Institute for the Study of War. Page 9. Apr.
2014. http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Hezbollah_Sullivan_FINAL.pdf.
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To maintain its interests and partnerships, the U.S. has deployed military forces
and hardware to the region, provided military assistance to Middle East partners to
bolster their defense capabilities against Iranian military assets, and engaged in top-level
diplomatic dialogue to respond to contingencies and strengthen regional strategic
relationships. For instance, the United States has over 35,000 troops in the Gulf region,
including “more than 10,000 forward-deployed soldiers…along with heavy armor,
artillery, and attack helicopters, to serve as a theater reserve and a bulwark against
aggression,” according to former Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel. 7 Additionally, the
U.S. military has deployed its most advanced aircraft, including F-22 fighters, advanced
intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance assets, and over 40 naval ships throughout
the region “to ensure that [the U.S.] can quickly respond to contingencies” and that “no
target is beyond [America’s] reach.”8
Iran understands it faces a conventional military disadvantage compared to the
United States and several of its regional allies that have been supplied with advanced
weaponry and training for decades from Washington. In response, Iran has used
asymmetric capabilities, for instance, supporting terrorist groups and proxy forces and
building up its naval mines stockpile, to counter this shortcoming.9 These tactics have
become enablers of destabilization in the region, such as worsening violent sectarianism
between Sunnis and Shia in areas like Iraq and Syria that present a threat to Middle East
stability. Unfortunately for the United States and its regional allies, Iran has had some

7

Parrish, Karen. “Hagel Outlines U.S. Posture, Way Ahead in Middle East.” U.S. Department of Defense. 7 Dec. 2013.
http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=121299.
8 Ibid.
9 “Iran’s Naval Forces: From Guerilla Warfare to a Modern Naval Strategy.” Office of Naval Intelligence, USN. Page
16. Fall 2009. http://www.oni.navy.mil/Intelligence_Community/docs/iran_navy_forces.pdf.
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success in implementing its destructive and destabilizing influence in parts of the Middle
East, particularly Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen.
These unstable, conflict-prone states, which remain recognized as sovereign states
by the U.S., are part of the regional-wide sectarian conflict between Sunnis and Shia
Muslims. The conflict between Sunnis and Shiites has been one root cause of today’s
instability in the region, as the consolidation of power in Arab governments and state
weakness has invigorated sects to resort to violence.10 In addition, these states are the
best examples where Iran has attempted to implement its expansionist policies to
strengthen its power in the Middle East and counter America’s strategy in the region.
Iran’s current meddling in the region includes backing the Bashar al-Assad
dictatorship and Hezbollah’s terrorist activities by transporting supplies and providing
training in order to preserve Iran’s strategic anchor in the Levant.11 Additionally,
Tehran’s material support of Shia militias battling U.S. forces and killing Sunnis
contributed to Iraq’s sectarian conflict and paved the way for greater Sunni dissatisfaction
and the rise of ISIS (Islamic State of Iraq and Syria).12 Iran’s funding of Hezbollah, one
of the most dangerous global terrorist groups, has also been a part of Tehran’s efforts in
projecting Iranian force throughout the Middle East.13
Iranian ideological expansionism, or Iran’s efforts to spread the Islamic
Republic’s revolutionary values that profess an anti-Western international order,

10

“Independent States in the World.” U.S. Department of State. 30 Dec. 2014. http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm.
Fulton, Will, Joseph Holliday, and Sam Wyer. “The Iranian Strategy in Syria.” American Enterprise Institute's
Critical Threats Project and Institute for the Study of War. Page 6. May 2013.
http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/IranianStrategyinSyria-1MAY.pdf.
12
Nader, Alireza. “Iran's Role in Iraq: Room for U.S.-Iran Cooperation?” RAND Corporation. Page 3. 2015.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/perspectives/PE100/PE151/RAND_PE151.pdf.
13 Iran’s Destabilizing Role in the Middle East (2014) (statement of Scott Modell to the House Foreign Affairs
Committee). http://csis.org/files/attachments/ts140716_Modell.pdf.
11
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threatens American interests, including the security of its regional allies who worry about
the effects of Iran’s foreign policy spilling over into their borders. For instance, Iran’s
support of Hezbollah and Shia factions in Syria to uphold the Assad regime has produced
refugee crises and deteriorated the security environments in areas like Lebanon and
Iraq.14
Therefore, the U.S. should develop a holistic approach with its regional partners
and prevent Iran from further destabilizing the Middle East. America’s strategy in the
Middle East to counter Iran’s disruptive hegemonic ambitions will have to address the
regional impact of the recent nuclear deal agreed upon between Iran and the world
powers. Because of the uncertainty over whether or not Iran’s behavior in the region will
be less hostile as a result of the nuclear deal, all measures should be taken by the U.S. to
ensure Iran does not act more volatile in the Middle East and threaten America’s allies
and interests.
The Iranian nuclear program began in the 1950s and Iran has been recognized as a
non-nuclear weapons state since it signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in
1970.15 As a non-nuclear weapons state (NNWS), Iran agreed in 1974 to a
comprehensive nuclear safeguards agreement with the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA) not to develop nuclear weapons.16

14

Young, William, David Stebbins, Bryan A. Frederick, and Omar Al-Shahery. “Spillover from the Conflict in Syria:
An Assessment of the Factors That Aid and Impede the Spread of Violence.” RAND Corporation. Pages 27-39. 2014.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR600/RR609/RAND_RR609.pdf.
15 The NPT defines a nuclear-weapon state as “one which has manufactured and exploded a nuclear weapon or other
nuclear explosive device” prior to January 1, 1967. These states are China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. However, non-NPT nuclear weapons states include Israel, Pakistan, India, and North Korea.
16 The IAEA is the United Nations nuclear watchdog responsible for promoting the safe, secure and peaceful use of
nuclear technologies.
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From the conception of its nuclear program, Tehran has publicly stated that it
does not seek nuclear weapons.17 Despite Iran’s rejection to become a nuclear weapons
state, the unanswered questions regarding Iran’s nuclear past and present activities worry
the U.S., its Gulf allies, and Israel. Iran’s determination to acquire nuclear weapons is
unclear, but it is apparent that Iran has developed advanced nuclear infrastructure that
raises concerns and presents a significant security threat for America’s allies.
The United States led the P5+1 (the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., France, plus
Germany) in striking a deal with Iran in July 2015, called the Joint Comprehensive Plan
of Action (JCPOA). The deal is designed to verify the peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear
program by setting stringent limitations on Iran’s enrichment program to prevent
weaponization in exchange for sanctions relief from the world powers and the United
Nations.18 While Iran’s regional behavior is of primary concern,19 Israel and Gulf States
in the Middle East are still worried about what an advanced Iranian nuclear program and
a comprehensive nuclear deal will do to the stability in the region. 20 As stated by many
in the Obama administration, the nuclear agreement with Iran aimed only to address the
concerns regarding Iran’s nuclear program and not its other destabilizing activities in the
Middle East.21 To counter Iran’s destabilizing policies and actions in the Middle East, it
will not only require the U.S. to provide strategic reassurances to its regional allies to

17

Sinha, Shreeya, and Susan C. Beachy. “Timeline on Iran’s Nuclear Program.” The New York Times. 19 Nov. 2014.
http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2014/11/20/world/middleeast/Iran-nuclear-timeline.html#/#time243_10809.
18 “Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action.” European Union External Action. 14 July 2015.
http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-eeas/docs/iran_agreement/iran_joint-comprehensive-plan-of-action_en.pdf.
19 Sen, Ashish Kumar. “Strange Bedfellows: Saudi Arabia, Israel Oppose Iran Nuclear Deal for Different
Reasons.” Atlantic Council. 16 Mar. 2015. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/new-atlanticist/strange-bedfellowssaudi-arabia-israel-oppose-iran-nuclear-deal-for-different-reasons.
20
Katzman, Kenneth. “Iran, Gulf Security, and U.S. Policy.” Federation of American Scientists. Congressional
Research Service. Page 40. 28 May 2015. https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL32048.pdf.
21 Kahl, Colin. Examining Regional Implications Of The Iran Deal. Stimson Center. Washington, DC. 29 July 2015.
http://www.stimson.org/events/examining-regional-implications-of-the-iran-deal/.

6

demonstrate America’s commitment to regional security, but the U.S. also must
cooperate with these allies to develop a comprehensive approach that limits Iran’s
destabilizing posture.22
Iran’s destabilizing acts, such as its support for terrorist groups, are under the
order of Iran’s Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, whose revolutionary ideology
reflects that of the Islamic Republic’s founder, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini.23
Although the JCPOA may open up future opportunities for better U.S.-Iranian relations,
there are many skeptics such as Iran’s hard liners, including the Supreme Leader, who see
the nuclear agreement as focused on the nuclear dilemma only and reject cooperation
with the U.S. on regional issues.24 Due to past and current distrust between the U.S. and
Iran, it would have been difficult for either side to push forward the idea of incorporating
cooperation on other issues into the JCPOA. Additionally, regional cooperation was
unlikely because of the U.S. Congress’ “concerns about Iran’s efforts to foment unrest,
brutal violence and terror have only grown” and members believe Iran will “continue to
use its nuclear program, and any economic relief, to further destabilize the region.” 25
While Israel has labeled the agreement as a “historic mistake,”26 many of America’s Gulf

22

Iran’s Destabilizing Role in the Middle East (2014) (statement of Scott Modell to the House Foreign Affairs
Committee). http://csis.org/files/attachments/ts140716_Modell.pdf.
23 Sadjadpour, Karim. “Reading Khamenei: The World View of Iran's Most Powerful Leader.” Washington D.C.
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. Page 3. 2009.
http://carnegieendowment.org/files/sadjadpour_iran_final2.pdf.
24 Eqbali, Aresu, and Asa Fitch. “Iran's Ayatollah Ali Khamenei Says Nuclear Deal Won't Change U.S. Ties.” The Wall
Street Journal. 18 July 2015. http://www.wsj.com/articles/irans-ayatollah-ali-khamenei-says-nuclear-deal-wontchange-u-s-ties-1437202111.
25
Fritz, Cory. “Speaker Boehner Statement on Iran Nuclear Talks.” Office of the Speaker of the House. 2 Apr. 2015.
http://www.speaker.gov/press-release/speaker-boehner-statement-iran-nuclear-talks.
26 Mitnick, Joshua. “Netanyahu Calls Iran Deal ‘Historic Mistake’” The Wall Street Journal. 14 July 2015.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/netanyahu-calls-iran-deal-historic-mistake-1436866617.
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allies have cautiously supported the Iran deal but continue to worry about Iran’s regional
ambitions.27
Presently, the U.S. is slowly transitioning to a posture of offshore balancing, a
grand strategy in a multipolar world whose underlying premise is “that it will become
increasingly more difficult, dangerous, and costly…to maintain order in, and control
over, the international political system.” 28 For the U.S., acting as an offshore balancer
relies “on local powers to counter aspiring regional hegemons and keep U.S. military
forces over the horizon,” but if necessary, “American troops come from offshore to help
do the job, and then leave once the potential hegemon is checked.”29 Today, Washington
is relying on Arab states to play a larger role in addressing regional security issues, while
also putting more focus on its “rebalance to Asia and the Pacific,” according to the 2015
U.S. National Security Strategy. 30 This developing posture is evident through U.S. troop
withdrawals from Afghanistan and Iraq, and with America primarily providing sea and
air support to assist its Arab allies in the current crisis in Yemen and the fight against the
Islamic State. Offshore balancing should not be mistaken for disengagement, but should
be supported by additional confidence-building measures from the U.S., such as regular
high-level political and strategic dialogue with regional allies and additional military
sales to improve the defense capabilities of Israel and GCC allies.31

27

Gordon, Michael R. “John Kerry Wins Gulf States’ Cautious Support for Iran Deal.” The New York Times. 3 Aug.
2015. http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/04/world/middleeast/gulf-states-cautiously-support-iran-nucleardeal.html?_r=0.
28 Layne, Christopher. “From Preponderance to Offshore Balancing: America's Future Grand Strategy.” International
Security. 22.1. Page 112. 1997.
29 Mearsheimer, John J. “Imperial by Design.” The National Interest. Page 18. Jan./Feb. 2011.
http://mearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0059.pdf.
30
White House. (2015). National Security Strategy. Page 34.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2015_national_security_strategy_2.pdf.
31 Schake, Kori. “Limits of Offshore Balancing.” Foreign Policy. 10 Oct. 2010.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2010/10/13/limits-of-offshore-balancing/.
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With U.S. attempts to ensure Iran does not become a nuclear weapons state, to
defeat ISIS, and promote stability in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere, the U.S. will require a
change in strategy that involves the support of its regional allies through additional
diplomatic and military assistance that incorporates addressing the threatening behavior
of an Iran with a robust nuclear program. Additionally, America’s allies will need to
place more emphasis on strengthening their ability to address the various threats posed by
Iran toward their security, whether it be enhancing cybersecurity, regional maritime
security cooperation, or deterring radical Shia factions from exacerbating sectarianism in
the region. To weaken the strategic threat posed by Iran and to reconfirm America’s
commitment to its Middle Eastern allies, the United States should use all elements of
national power to develop a holistic, cost-effective strategy through the implementation
of an offshore balance approach coupled with bolstering the defenses of regional allies
capable of preserving U.S. interests and promoting stability in the world’s most hostile
region.

9

CHAPTER 1: THE QUARRELSOME HISTORY OF U.S.-IRANIAN RELATIONS
AND ITS INFLUENCE ON ANTI-AMERICANISM IN IRAN

1953 CIA Coup in Iran
The U.S.-led operation to overthrow Iranian Prime Minister Mohammad
Mossadeq is a symbol of Iranian distrust toward the United States. What led to the coup
against Mossadeq was his growing popularity among the Iranian people, as he strongly
advocated for the nationalization of the country’s oil industry as a member of the Iranian
parliament and then as the prime minister. For the United Kingdom, this was worrisome.
Nationalizing the oil industry would endanger the economic profits gained from the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC) that it created in 1908. In 1933, the U.K. and Iran
agreed to a 60-year concession, which continued the U.K.’s exclusive right to carry out
oil operations within designated areas in Iran.
After World War II, nationalism and democracy became important features in
Iranian politics. Nationalist feelings led many Iranians to reject foreign control of their
oil industry, specifically the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company which was vital to Iran’s
economy. Britain viewed the AIOC as strategically important in preventing communism
from spreading to Iran, and as a source of valuable oil revenues. When the Iranian
government sought to renegotiate the 1933 Concession Agreement, Britain’s counteroffer
was deemed inappropriate and rejected by Iran.32 As a result, a bill of Mohammed
Mossadeq’s passed which nationalized the AIOC’s Iranian assets, while Britain
prevented oil flow out of Iran in response. Britain claimed in its exchanges with the U.S.

32

“The Oil Nationalization Issue.” Stanford University. Keesing’s Worldwide, LLC. Pages 6-7. 2006.
http://web.stanford.edu/group/tomzgroup/pmwiki/uploads/3195-1951-07-Keesings-a-OEP.pdf.
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at the time that Iran was unstable and likely to fall victim to the forces of communism.
Additionally, the United States feared the only beneficiary of Mossadeq’s policies would
be the Soviet Union, which “compelled [it]…in planning and executing [Operation
Ajax].”33 As a result, the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), with the help of the British
Secret Intelligence Service (SIS), sponsored a coup to oust Prime Minister Mossadeq.
Iranians have always assumed the 1953 coup against the democratically-elected
prime minister was an American operation. In 2009, President Barack Obama officially
recognized America’s role in Operation Ajax during a speech in Cairo, Egypt.34 In
addition to this acknowledgment, the CIA in August 2013 declassified documents that
outlined America’s role in the coup, as well as the involvement of the United Kingdom.35
According to the declassified documents, the objective of the operation was to
replace the Mossadeq government “with a pro-Western government under the Shah’s
leadership” using “legal, or quasi-legal, methods.”36 The U.S. felt that Mossadeq was
incapable of reaching an oil settlement with the United Kingdom and that Iran was in
danger of falling into the Soviet sphere of influence. The covert operation, drafted by
both the U.S. and U.K., primarily included an intensified propaganda effort by creating
false stories to weaken the Mossadeq government, such as stating that Mossadeq staged
an illegal coup against General Zahedi (an opponent of Mossadeq and chosen by the CIA
and SIS to succeed Mossadeq once the coup concluded) and forced the Shah to leave

33

Byrne, Malcolm. “CIA Admits It Was Behind Iran’s Coup.” Foreign Policy. 19 Aug. 2013.
http://foreignpolicy.com/2013/08/19/cia-admits-it-was-behind-irans-coup/.
34 “Remarks By The President On A New Beginning.” Cairo University. Cairo, Egypt. 4 June 2009. The White House.
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09.
35 “CIA Confirms Role in 1953 Iran Coup.” The National Security Archive. George Washington University. 19 Aug.
2013. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/.
36 “Campaign To Install Pro-Western Government In Iran.” The National Security Archive. George Washington
University. 21 June 2011. http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB435/docs/Doc%202%20-%201954-0000%20Summary%20of%20Wilber%20history.pdf.
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Iran. As a result, the Iranian public was angered by this news and led mass pro-Shah
protests in Tehran and throughout other provinces.37 After pro-Shah demonstrations and
disseminating “gray propaganda,” or false information without any identifiable source,
Mossadeq and his government were forced to flee, allowing General Zahedi to succeed
Mossadeq and pave way for the Shah to return to power.
The coup in 1953 has influenced the anti-American, as well as anti-Western,
sentiment in Iran, including Iranians’ negative perception of American motivations and
policies toward Iran in applying economic pressure during the nuclear negotiations. 38
While some did support the return of the Shah, America’s role in replacing Mossadeq
portrayed fear and anxiety among Iranians, which stirred anti-Americanism throughout
Iran. As a result of the coup, “the United States ultimately became identified by many
Iranians as the new imperial force in the country” and religious and hard line ideology
grew within Iranian politics.39 The coup orchestrated by the U.S. and Britain that ousted
Mossadeq still remains a major source of grievance for many Iranians and continues to
give hard liners in Tehran legitimacy to promote their radical ideology that threatens the
U.S. and its Middle Eastern allies. Had not the United States played an integral role in
placing the Shah in power, it is uncertain how Iranian foreign policy and perception of
the West would have been shaped in the past 35 years.

37

Wilber, Donald. “Clandestine Services History, Overthrow of Premier Mossadeq of Iran: November 1952 - August
1953 – Summary.” The National Security Archive. George Washington University. Pages x-xi. March 1954.
http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB28/summary.pdf.
38 Mohseni, Ebrahim, Nancy Gallagher, and Clay Ramsay. “Iranian Attitudes on Nuclear Negotiations - A Public
Opinion Study.” Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland. Pages 16 and 18. Sept. 2014.
http://worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/2014/iranian_attitudes_on_nuclear_negotations__final__091614.pdf.
39 Rubin, Barry. Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience and Iran. New York: Oxford UP. 1980. Page
57.
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1979 Islamic Revolution
The 1953 coup produced two decades of dictatorship under the Shah and changed
and modernized Iran’s society too rapidly for some opponents of the Shah. The most
well-known element of the Shah’s regime that was hated by Iranians was his secret
police, or the Sazeman-e Ettela’at va Amniyat-e Keshvar (SAVAK). SAVAK was
created in 1957 with assistance from the CIA and Israel’s Mossad. The organization was
designated to crack down on opponents of the Shah using extreme tactics such as torture
to intimidate the populace.40 Because of the close ties the United States had with the
Shah, many Iranians viewed SAVAK as inseparable from Western interference in Iran’s
affairs and the government’s repressive control. The dissent that arose from the Iranian
people led to demonstrations supporting Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, who was living
in exile in Paris at the time. Ayatollah Khomeini was a religious leader in Iran who was
from Iran for his outspoken opposition to the Shah. Eventually, Khomeini returned to
Iran and became the leader of the Islamic Republic of Iran, thus, the position of velayat-e
faqih (guardianship of the jurist) was established in the Iranian constitution.
Once Khomeini rose to power after the revolution, the United States continued to
oppose him or his anti-Western ideological revolution.41 Because Khomeini blamed the
United States for the problems Iranians had endured under the Shah, attitudes and actions
between these two nations worsened.42 The resentment felt by Iranians during the Shah’s
reign and after the revolution continues to be present in parts of Iranian society. As
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recently as last November, anti-American demonstrations were held on the 35th
anniversary of the start of the Iran hostage crisis, where chants of “Death to America”
were heard from the crowds.43
While the revolutionary ideologies that drove the Shah from power and American
presence out of Iran are still present in certain aspects of Iranian society today, its overall
impact expands beyond Iran’s borders. The Islamic Revolution and the ideologies that
transpired as a result of the revolution have impacted the Middle East and its current
environment. As Dr. Mehrzad Boroujerdi, a professor of political science at Syracuse
University, said in 2014:
“The emergence of Hezbollah in Lebanon, the moral boost provided to
Shia forces in Iraq, the regional cold war against Saudi Arabia and Israel,
lending an Islamic flavor to the anti-imperialist, anti-American sentiment
in the Middle East, and inadvertently widening the Sunni-Shia cleavage,
are for me the most important by-products of the Iranian revolution.”44
Dr. Boroujerdi accurately lists the enduring impact that the 1979 Revolution had
on the Middle East. Hezbollah originated in the Shiite communities in Lebanon who
took up arms against Israel’s occupation in 1982 to institute an Iranian-style clerical
regime. In addition, America’s deployment of U.S. troops to Beirut during the Lebanon
war to resolve the internal violence was seen by Hezbollah militants as an occupying
force and later led Hezbollah to attack a U.S. embassy and Marine barracks.45 In Iraq,
Shiites groups supported by Iran believed America was an imperialist power and killed
U.S. soldiers during the mid-2000s. Finally, Iran’s revolutionary ideology from 1979 that
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promotes Iran as a regional power has labeled the U.S. culture as “a plague or an
intoxication that alienated Muslims from their roots and identity.”46
Khomeini’s rise to power and the 1979 Revolution removed the benefits the U.S.
had enjoyed in Iran during the Shah’s ruling. Khomeini’s distrust of the U.S. led to his
decisions to prohibit the U.S. from gathering information on the Soviets within Iran and
end arms purchases from the U.S., thus depriving the U.S. of a reliable ally who could
safeguard Western interests in the region.47 In addition to removing American influence
in Iran after 1979, Khomeini also supported, endorsed, and praised any anti-American
sentiment, protests, and actions that isolated Iran from the U.S. Prior to the 1953 coup,
“many Iranians thought of Americans as friends, [supporters] of the fragile democracy
they had spent half a century trying to build.” 48 U.S. intervention to remove Mossadeq
ended what Iranians believed was the closest they had ever been to democracy. Thus,
anti-Americanism was characterized by “a relatively new identification of American
power as a force for repression rather than liberation in the Arab [and Persian] world.” 49
Not only did the 1953 coup and 1979 Islamic Revolution spark Iranian hatred toward the
United States, but as will be discussed in the next section, America’s involvement in
Iran’s war with Iraq only strengthened the Iranian hard line view that the U.S. seeks to
destroy the Islamic Republic.
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Iran-Iraq War (1980-88)
Following the revolution, additional events transpired that further heightened the
hostility between Washington and Tehran. Several of those occurred during the Iran-Iraq
War, or what Iranians refer to as Imposed War and Holy Defense. The armed conflict
between the two nations was one that could not be ignored by the U.S. Both parties, Iran
and Iraq, were two important oil producing and exporting nations and their war could
threaten the free flow of oil to the global market.
When the U.S. feared imminent defeat for Iraq after Iran repelled Iraqi forces in
1982, Washington chose to play a greater role in the conflict. To maintain a balance
between Iraq and Iran, the United States supplied Saddam Hussein and his forces with
American arms, technology and intelligence.50 American aid to Iraq prevented Iran from
winning the war and Washington also viewed an Iraqi loss in the war as “contrary to U.S.
interests.”51
Additionally, the lack of U.S. response of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against
Iran during the war also did not help the deteriorating relationship between Tehran and
Washington. In the 1980s, Saddam and his military forces launched at least ten chemical
attacks where the Iranian government estimates that more than 60,000 soldiers were
exposed to mustard gas and nerve agents like sarin and tabun.52 While the United States
“strongly condemned” Saddam’s use of chemical weapons, the overall response to Iraq’s
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inhumane military attacks were minute.53 The U.S. and several of its Western partners
banned the sale to Iraq of precursor chemicals involved in the production of mustard and
nerve agents, however, more could have been done to demonstrate America’s
commitment to the prohibition of chemical weapons while alleviating tensions felt
toward the U.S. from the Iranian population.54
Another example demonstrating America’s involvement in the conflict happened
in the so-called Tanker War, which involved “Iraq’s attempts to weaken Iran by
destroying its ability to use tankers to export oil, and a U.S.-led Western naval presence
in the Gulf…to ensure the freedom of passage for tankers to Kuwait and the overall
security of shipping to and from neutral Gulf countries.”55 Although the United States
first used military force against Iraq in response to its attack on a U.S. radar frigate, the
USS Stark, a particular event then occurred that forced the U.S. take military action
against Tehran.
The incident that ignited deep tensions between the U.S. and Iran during the antishipping campaigns in the Iran-Iraq War was Iran’s mining of the Arabian Gulf. While
the USS Samuel B. Roberts was coasting in the Arabian Gulf to maintain freedom of
navigation, it was struck by a submerged mine deployed by Iran. In response, the U.S.
launched Operation Praying Mantis which called for the destruction of two oil platforms
used by Iran to coordinate attacks on merchant shipping. When the operation concluded,
the U.S. had sank an Iranian frigate, disabled another frigate, and destroyed a 147-foot
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missile patrol boat.56 Essentially, the United States damaged half of the Iranian
operational naval fleet and, according to Vice Adm. (Ret.) James B Perkins, III, “finished
the Iranian Navy in the Arabian Gulf.”57 In reviewing Operation Praying Mantis, the
U.S. achieved its objectives of no U.S. or civilian casualties, no collateral damage, and
destroying Iranian surveillance, gas/oil, and military platforms. 58
Another provocation between the Islamic Republic and the U.S. that occurred at
the end of the Iran-Iraq War was when a U.S. Navy warship shot down an Iranian
commercial airliner killing nearly 300 people.59 The missile cruiser Vincennes, which
had been exchanging fire with small Iranian ships in the Arabian Gulf, mistaken the
airliner for what it was believed to be an F-14 and downed the airliner with a surface-toair missile. Although an accident, Tehran was convinced that America’s action was a
signal that the United States had decided to openly enter the war on Iraq's side . Two
months later, the conflict ended with Iraq and Iran agreeing to a U.N. cease-fire.
The mentioned past events involving engagement between the U.S. and Iran not
only impacted their relationship during the 20th century, but have also exacerbated the
geopolitical challenges Washington faces in its relations with Tehran today. America’s
interference in Tehran’s politics and its role during the Iran-Iraq War confirmed the
impression by many Iranians that the U.S. cannot be trusted. Conversely, Iran’s
revolutionary ideology that calls for anti-Americanism and Tehran’s support for terrorist
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groups, who have killed Americans and Coalition forces, have made U.S. leadership
weary of Iran’s intentions in the Middle East.60 In all, many Iranians remain distrustful
toward the U.S. because of its interference in Iran’s domestic affairs and animosity
toward the Iranian people.61 The next section of this chapter will examine other notable
concerns about Iran’s policies that have impacted U.S.-Iranian relations.

America’s Concerns Over Iran
For decades, Iran has supported terrorism throughout the Middle East, failed to
live up to its international obligations, limited democracy and freedom within its borders,
and expanded its missile program that endangers the security of the Middle East and the
United States by worsening regional crises that prevent long-term stability and U.S.
interests from being pursued.62 Iran’s support for terrorism has negatively impacted
America’s strategy in the region by further driving sectarian violence that impedes U.S.
efforts to help build strong governance in areas like Iraq and Lebanon. In addition, Iran’s
sponsorship of terrorism threatens the security of its allies, such as Israel who is in
constant defense against pro-Iranian terrorist groups like Hezbollah and Hamas and views
Iran and its proxies as threats.63 As for Iran’s growing ballistic missile arsenal, not only
does Iran have missiles capable of reaching the borders of U.S. allies, but there is a
concern that Iran would likely use missiles as a delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons if it

60

“Country Reports on Terrorism 2006: Chapter 3 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview.” U.S. Department of
State. 30 Apr. 2007. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2006/82736.htm.
61 “Wall of Distrust between Iran and US.” PressTV. 2 July 2015.
http://www.presstv.ir/Detail/2015/07/02/418452/Iran-US-distrust-wall.
62
White House (2010). National Security Strategy. Page 26.
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf.
63 “Country Reports on Terrorism 2014: Chapter 3 -- State Sponsors of Terrorism Overview.” U.S. Department of
State. June 2015. http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2014/239410.htm.

19

chose to develop such weapons.64 Below is a more descriptive outline of the policies of
Iran that are viewed as threatening to the U.S., its allies, and Middle East security.
Iran’s Support for Terrorism. Even as the United States and other nations call
on Iran to end its relationships with terrorist groups, Iran continues to provide arms,
money, and other forms of aid to Islamist groups who target the U.S. and its allies. Iran
has been a State Sponsor of Terrorism, according to the U.S. State Department, since
January 19, 1984 for its support for the Lebanon-based militant group Hezbollah.65
Iran’s support for terrorism has a global reach: from supplying Hezbollah and
other Shia militant groups to helping uphold the Assad regime in Syria, to assisting
Houthi rebels in Yemen in their efforts to control Yemen. It is important to understand
Iran’s history of continued support for global terrorism, as these groups are used as
proxies to further Tehran’s objectives and endanger U.S. interests by weakening U.S.
influence in the region and launching attacks against American regional allies. In the
Middle East, Iran heavily relies on terrorist organizations as an asymmetric capability to
help achieve its objectives in the region without disclosing overt Iranian involvement.
Iran’s Involvement in Iraq War. The United States went into Iraq in 2003
primarily to remove Saddam Hussein from power and liberate the Iraqi people, eliminate
Iraq’s supposed weapons of mass destruction, and to drive out terrorists who found safe
harbor in Iraq.66 Additionally, America’s involvement in Iraq led to U.S. troops and
Iranian soldiers and pro-Iranian Shiite militias in Iraq fighting on the battlefield. Iran’s
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involvement grew once the U.S. liberated Iraq, in order to encourage sectarian violence
and prevent U.S. influence over a country that is a neighbor to Iran. Shiite militias were
able to withstand U.S. and Coalition forces during the war in large part due to the help of
the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force (IRGC-QF).67
Iran’s Quds Force is a special operations unit of the IRGC responsible for
extraterritorial operations to protect and export the Islamic Revolution. The IRGC-QF is
the Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorists abroad. Following
the U.S. liberation of Iraq in 2003, the U.S. alleged that Iran aided Shia resistance groups
and militias in Iraq. Much of Iranian support for these groups in Iraq came from the
Quds Force. According to field reports disclosed by WikiLeaks, which were never
intended to be made public, Iran was deeply involved in America’s war efforts in Iraq. 68
For instance, Iran and the Quds Forces’ provided Iraqi militias with rockets,
magnetic bombs that can be attached to the underside of cars, explosively formed
penetrators (EFPs), and other weapons. Those include powerful .50-caliber rifles and the
Misagh-1 surface-to-air missile, which was believed to have downed one American
helicopter in east Baghdad in July 2007. 69 Several of the most active militias who fought
against American troops and supported by Iran were the Badr Brigade, the armed wing of
one of Iraq’s most religious Shiite parties whose base is in southern Iraq, and Jaish alMahdi.
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In addition to the activity by the Quds Force, Hezbollah, Iran’s Lebanese ally, was
believed to also have trained Iraqi militants in Iran or gave guidance to Iraqi militias who
fought with Iranian financing and weapons.70 The U.S. has assumed Hezbollah sent
hundreds of its own fighters into Iraq as part of what it believed to be “the new
battleground in the fight against the U.S., as claimed by an American Special Operations
Task Force.”71 Not only was Hezbollah active in Iraq during America’s military
campaign to secure a stable government in Baghdad, but the Lebanese terrorist group has
also been known for its attacks on American soldiers and U.S. allies for the past three
decades.
Iran and Hezbollah. Iran sees its relations with Hezbollah as vital to its operations
throughout the Middle East. Hezbollah, or “Party of God,” originated in the aftermath of
Israel's invasion in 1982 and its occupation during Lebanon’s civil war and became a
Shiite Muslim political group with a militant wing. With their shared hatred against
Israel, Iran and Hezbollah have remained closely aligned since the 1980s.
On October 8, 1997, Hezbollah was named a Foreign Terrorist Organization by
the State Department.72 As stated before, Hezbollah has been involved in numerous
terrorist attacks directed at the U.S. that have killed over 300 Americans, including the
suicide truck bombings of the U.S. Embassy in Beirut in April 1983, the U.S. Marine
barracks in Beirut in October 1983, and the U.S. Embassy annex in Beirut in September
1984, the hijacking of TWA 847 in 1985, and the Khobar Towers attack in Saudi Arabia
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in 1996.73 Hezbollah has partnered closely with the Iranian regime, where Iran has
invested nearly $200 million annually to support the group’s objectives. 74 Iran and the
strategic threat of Hezbollah seek to exploit unrest in the Middle East to the weaken the
security of the U.S. and its regional allies, which has served further as a destabilizing
force within the region by increasing sectarian tensions and conflict.
Iran’s has led Hezbollah to help Syria’s dictator remain in power, which
exemplifies the Shia militant group’s role in Iran’s foreign policy. President Bashar alAssad, a strategic ally of Tehran, continues to control the Syrian government, which
arguably would not be the case if Iran was not providing military and economic aid by
sending military advisers and giving Syria credit lines in the amount of over $4.6 billion
since the start of the civil war in Syria.75 Iran has continued to aid Hezbollah in Syria,
while it sends expeditionary forces with a most recent deployment of 15,000 according to
a Lebanese source,76 acting as a secondary army for the Assad regime to prevent rebels or
Sunni terrorist groups from threatening the survival of the regime.77 As one senior
administration official said, “Iran and Hezbollah have enlisted Alawite, Iraqi, Shia
militant and terrorist groups to participate in counter-opposition operations in Syria...And
unfortunately, it’s clear that both Hezbollah and Iran’s involvement in Syria is only
deepening.”78
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Hezbollah continues to have a significant presence in Syria, but the group’s true
base resides in Lebanon, which borders with Israel, Iran’s rival. According to the State
Department’s 2013 Country Reports on Terrorism:
“Since the end of the 2006 Israeli-Hizbollah conflict, Iran has also assisted
in rearming Hizbollah, in direct violation of UNSCR 1701. Iran has
provided hundreds of millions of dollars in support of Hizbollah in
Lebanon and has trained thousands of its fighters at camps in Iran. These
trained fighters often use these skills in support of the Asad regime in
Syria.”79
Iran, which sees itself as a rising power in the Middle East, has used Hezbollah in
a manner that has allowed Tehran to indirectly engage in multiple regional arenas.
Because the U.S. has an interest in the security of Israel, a well-funded Hezbollah
threatens that goal and enables Iran to project its destabilizing policies in the Levant.
Iran’s Support for Terrorism in the Gaza Strip. As with Hezbollah, who also
provides support to several Palestinian terrorist organizations, Iran’s aid to Palestinian
terror groups, such as Hamas, the Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) and the Popular Front for
the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC), poses a national security
threat to the state of Israel.
Hamas’ ties to Tehran came to a temporary pause in 2012 due to conflicting
stances on the Syrian civil war.80 Within the last year, Hamas and the Iranian regime
have resumed their relations. During the fighting last summer between Israel and Hamas,
Iran was found providing military support to the militant wing of the Palestinian
movement. In July 2014, the Supreme Leader of Iran stated, “The Muslim world has a
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duty to arm the Palestinian nation by all means.”81 The battle between the Palestinian
jihadi group and Israel was seen by the Supreme Leader as another example of Israeli
aggression against Muslims.
To support Hamas against the Israeli military, Iran was reported by two senior
Iranian officials to have supplied missile technology to Hamas for its fight against Israel
during the 2014 summer.82 The conflict last summer essentially ended in a stalemate, but
Israel was successful in destroying dozens of underground tunnels used by Hamas to
attack Israel and smuggle weapons and other goods. However, this past April
intelligence reports found Iran sending millions of dollars to Hamas primarily to rebuild
the network of tunnels destroyed during the Israeli Defense Force’s response to rocket
attacks launched by Hamas militants from Gaza last summer.83
Another Palestinian-based terrorist group that the Islamic Republic has been
known to support is the Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ). The PIJ is a relatively small
Islamic, Palestinian nationalist organization that embraces Islam as a religion and state.
Although Sunni, like Hamas, the militant group was given inspiration to further its
mission and goals from revolutionary, theocratic ideals that arose from the 1979 Islamic
Revolution.
The PIJ is a direct threat to Israel through its history of suicide bombings and
rocket attacks aimed at Israel and Iran’s support of the group again questions the regime’s
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true intentions in regards to nuclear diplomacy. 84 According to Jonathan Schanzer, a
former terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Treasury Department, Iran’s engagement
with PIJ leaders “underscores the fact that despite the ongoing diplomacy between Iran
and the U.S. over its nuclear program,” the “PIJ is now perhaps the most dangerous actor
in the Gaza Strip in light of the support it receives from the Iranian regime.”85
Tehran’s support for terrorism is unlikely to decline, as it remains a strategic
asymmetric capability aimed to project its power in the region. In addition to the threat
posed by Iran’s support for terrorism, Iran also poses as a regional concern through its
missile program which threatens the security of U.S. allies and has the potential to be
linked to missile-deliverable nuclear weapons if Iran embarked on that path.
Iran’s Missile Program. In order for a country to deliver a nuclear weapon to a
target, it must successfully develop a launch vehicle that can accurately carry a nuclear
payload. Iran has agreed to not conduct any activity related to ballistic missiles designed
to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons until eight years after the JCPOA is
adopted.86 Nonetheless, the U.S. continues to be worried about the expanding Iranian
missile program. Iran’s deployed missile arsenal, the largest in the Middle East, contains
short and medium-range missiles that threaten Israel and U.S. Gulf allies, but also “are
capable of reaching Europe” according to President Obama.87 Plus, Iran has conducted
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multiple successful launches of a two-stage space launch vehicle (SLV) and has also
revealed a larger two-stage SLV, which could serve as a test bed for developing
technologies for an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the United
States.88 Despite Iran’s inability to strike the U.S. homeland, its ballistic missiles of
shorter distances, along with its cruise missiles, pose a significant danger to American
allies in the Middle East.
Iran’s missile program provides the regime with a wide mix of strategic
capabilities. However, there is question to the lethality and accuracy of most of Iran’s
ballistic missiles, which is likely due to difficulties in acquiring advanced components to
improve these features.89 At the moment, UN sanctions are being enforced that forbid
countries from selling missiles or missile technology to Iran. 90 However, according to a
United Nations Security Council draft resolution passed after the nuclear accord was
agreed upon, countries will be allowed to sell such equipment and technology to Iran five
years after the adoption of the nuclear deal.”91 Because the utility of Iran’s ballistic
missiles against Israel and U.S. Gulf allies are limited in accuracy and destructiveness,
they are unlikely to be decisive in wartime, rather, used as political or psychological
weapons to terrorize an adversary.
However, there may be situations where Iran would use its ballistic missiles to
attack potential enemies, despite their limitedness. For instance, with its short range
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missiles, Iran could launch large volleys of shorter-range missiles in order to increase its
chance of hitting its intended target. Additionally, as Iran has demonstrated, short range
missiles can be shipped to Iranian proxy groups to attack U.S. regional allies such as
Israel. As Iran improves the efficacy of its short range missiles, it is important for the
U.S. to provide military and technological assistance in preventing Iran’s short range
missiles from being used by proxy groups against Israel. For long range missiles, they
are able to cover a range that spreads across the Gulf, but Iran has yet to establish the
reliability or accuracy of these missiles through testing and engineering. 92 U.S.
intelligence has stated Iran has been working toward improving the range and accuracy of
these missile systems.93 As Iran continues to improve its missile inventory, while also
incorporating the belief that Iran will now invest more funding into these systems as a
result of sanctions relief from the JCPOA, the U.S. must strengthen its commitment to the
security of its Middle East allies to ensure allied defenses trump the missile capabilities
of Iran and its proxy and terrorist groups.

Conclusion
The hostility and distrust between the United States and the Islamic Republic of
Iran has been an ongoing theme for over 35 years. Despite what Americans read or hear
in the media, there was a time when Tehran and Washington were close allies.
Unfortunately, the U.S.-backed Shah became an oppressive ruler who infuriated the
Iranian populace that led to the Islamic Revolution and the beginning of anti-
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Americanism in the Persian state. From 1979 to the present day, diplomatic relations
between both countries have been disrupted, but the U.S. and Iran put forth great efforts
that ended in reaching an agreement addressing Iran’s nuclear program.
U.S.-Iranian relations provide background as to why there is hostility between the
two nations and why implementing a nuclear deal involves more than technical details,
i.e., trust between both states. Because of America’s interference in Iranian affairs during
the 20th century, along with other world powers like the U.K. and Soviet Union, Iran has
sought ways to deter future foreign intervention through conventional and unconventional
military means. As a result, Iran has developed capabilities such as sponsoring terrorist
groups and increasing its missile stockpile, both of which are factors of destabilization in
the Middle East. Addressing the threatening elements of Iran’s foreign policy, as
outlined in this chapter, is necessary to ensure American interests are preserved in the
Middle East.
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CHAPTER 2: CONFLICTING U.S. AND IRANIAN FOREIGN POLICY
OBJECTIVES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

Both the United States and Iran view a strong position in the Middle East as vital
to achieving their strategic interests in the region. For Iran, it lives in the Middle East,
thus, the crises and conflicts that transpire in the region impact its security directly, which
is why Iran feels its activities of supporting terrorist groups and enhancing conflict to
destabilize the region are legitimate. On the other hand, the U.S. seeks stability in the
Middle East to help develop a region “where democracy takes root and human rights are
upheld” while combatting the threat of terrorism, ensuring the free flow of energy, and
dismantling terrorist networks that threaten American lives. 94
To achieve its goals, the U.S. maintains a regional military presence; invests in
the ability of Israel and Arab partners to deter aggression; and takes actions to reduce the
underlying causes of conflict in the region.95 The conflict that has spread from the
Levant to the Arabian Gulf is not directly caused by Iran itself, but Iran has exacerbated
certain regional crises to garner more influence and power.
In response to America’s major role in the region, the Islamic Republic has
pursued policies meant to improve its protection from foreign influence, while providing
it with opportunities to exert influence across the region. Thus, regime survival is
Tehran’s highest priority and acts as a policy motivator, which provides the regime with
reason to pursue expansionist policies in proliferating its revolutionary ideologies and
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strengthening its position in the Middle East. 96 Iran has taken opportunities to spread and
sustain its revolutionary, anti-Western ambitions in the Gulf and greater Middle East by
funding terrorist groups and Shiite militias, while also using soft power by strengthening
its relations with certain Arab governments in the region. 97
Iran has been productive in using soft power to achieve its hegemonic ambitions
in the region using sources of Iranian culture, values, and policies.98 The most notable
example is Tehran’s efforts to become closer with the Iraqi government. Iran has also
been engaging in public diplomacy with other Arab nations to develop closer relations
and to present itself as a better partner than the U.S.
What is worrisome about Iran’s public diplomacy in the Middle East is that Iran is
using such efforts to better position itself as the vanguard of a new, just Islamic world.
Iran’s leadership and the IRGC lead efforts to build political and armed proxy groups, to
expand Iran’s reach, and build a resistance to the U.S. and Israel. 99 Iran sees itself as “a
model” and “the driving force of the Islamic world,” which requires the absence of
American influence in the Middle East.100 These ambitious comments seem to be more
egotistical rather than realistic, as Iranians are not viewed in a positive light by all
Muslims. For the past decade or so, Iran has become a greater player in the Middle East;
from using Hezbollah to spread Iranian ideology in Lebanon and to fight for the survival
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of the Assad regime, to demonstrating its capability to protect Iraq in the fight against
ISIS. The United States has continued to take actions to limit Iran’s influence and power
in the region, but it will now have to do so by enhancing its cooperation and support with
regional allies.
While Iran has taken opportunities to advance its foreign policy goals in the
Middle East during regional and sectarian conflicts, the U.S. remains on the periphery of
the struggles in the region. To deal with Iran and its growing power, cooperation with
regional allies who have direct links to the root causes of Middle East instability can help
shape the regional order in a way that limits Tehran’s ability to achieve its expansionist
policies. As many of the region’s conflicts have a sectarian root, the United States should
encourage its allies in the Gulf to condemn sectarian rhetoric that Iran has used to
increase its power and influence in the Middle East.101
This chapter will analyze U.S. and Iranian foreign policy in the Middle East and
how each state’s strategy to achieve its policy objectives conflicts with one another. In
particular, Iran has demonstrated its willingness to exert greater influence in four areas of
the region: Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. These four states, which may not be like
other regional states such as Oman or the United Arab Emirates whose borders are secure
and governments are stable, are ranked in order of most important to the Iranian regime
and its strategic interests.
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U.S. Foreign Policy in the Middle East
Traditionally, the United States has had three principal interests in the Middle
East: to maintain a regional balance of power; to make certain that the flow of oil is not
interrupted; and to defeat the Islamist terror groups in the region that threaten the security
of the region, of friends and allies in the region, and for the United States.102 These
interests continue to influence America’s strategy in the Middle East and will likely
continue to do so even as the U.S. military footprint lessens in the region.
One aspect of U.S. policy in the Middle East focuses on denying U.S. regional
opponents, such as Iran and Syria, the means to undermine U.S. strategic interests in the
region. The U.S. has attempted to deny those seeking to weaken its strategy in the
Middle East by preserving a regional order that favors broader U.S. interests in the
region, which includes foreign aid to Arab governments friendly to the U.S. and
safeguarding Israel’s national security through military assistance to bolster Israeli
defenses.
The United States has placed strategic importance on the Middle East since the
Cold War when it was vying for influence in the region against the Soviet Union. The
first stark example of U.S. strategic interest in the region was demonstrated by the Nixon
administration (1969-74). The Nixon Doctrine marked a new era of U.S. policy in the
Gulf and led to what was known as the “twin pillar” policy, where the U.S. relied on Iran
and Saudi Arabia as the two “pillars” to maintain stability and protect America’s interests
in the region.103 The U.S. implemented this policy primarily through the sale of
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American military equipment, majority of that being sold to Iran. Compared to today,
U.S. interests in the region have not changed, however, Iran is not the Westernized,
secular, pro-American regional power it was under the Shah.
Following the Nixon administration, President Carter (1979-81) implemented his
own policy in the Middle East through what is known as the Carter Doctrine. In
President Carter’s 1980 State of the Union Address to Congress he stated, “An attempt by
any outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault
on the vital interests of the [U.S.], and such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force.” 104 Since the Carter administration, the U.S. has
taken action to assure its interests in the Gulf are protected from not only outside forces,
but also from internal actors as well. In relation to the security environment today, the
U.S. views Iran’s foreign policy as an attempt to control parts of the Gulf region.
During the Ronald Reagan administration (1981-89), the U.S. was focused on the
balancing the power between Iran and Iraq. As stated earlier in this paper, Washington’s
balance of power strategy favored Iraq, but the U.S. also sided with Iran to achieve
certain foreign policy objectives such as providing arms in exchange for American
hostages held by Hezbollah militants in Lebanon.105 Following Reagan, U.S.-Iranian
relations were stagnant during President George H.W. Bush’s time in office (1989-93).
In all, the Bush administration’s policy on Iran was shaped by Iraq’s 1990 invasion of
Kuwait, American hostages held by Iranian allies in Lebanon and a new round of Arab-
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Israeli peace talks.106 As for President Bill Clinton (1993-2001), his Iran policy can be
described as “dual containment,” which emphasized isolating both Iran and Iraq
politically, economically, and militarily. 107
When President George W. Bush was in office (2001-09), his foreign policy
centered on the promotion of democracy worldwide, which included viewing Iran as a
barrier to that policy. During his 2002 State of the Union Speech, President George W.
Bush labeled Iran as part of the “axis of evil,” or states who were threatening the peace of
the world and developing WMD capabilities.108
In his 2006 State of the Union, President Bush attempted to reach out to the
Iranian populace. He openly addressed part of his speech to Iranians saying, “America
respects you and we respect your country. We respect your right to choose your own
future and win your own freedom. And our nation hopes one day to be the closest of
friends with a free and democratic Iran.”109 Unfortunately, the only glimpse of change in
overturning the theocratic government of Iran was the Green Movement following the
2009 Iranian presidential elections.110 Many protests took place but ultimately Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad (President of Iran from 2005 to 2013) remained in office and the voice for
more transparency was drowned out. President Ahmadinejad was a hard liner in Iranian
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politics who detested the U.S. and called for the “elimination” of Israel.111 For most of
the Bush presidency, the U.S. was not directly involved in Iranian affairs, which, in
addition to A.Q. Khan’s international proliferation network that assisted Iran in the
development its nuclear infrastructure, resulted in the progression of Iran’s nuclear
program topped with U.S. and international sanctions on the Iranian economy.
Once the Obama administration (2009-present) entered the White House,
President Obama intended on implementing a diplomatic approach to help mend U.S.Iranian relations. Even during his campaigning for the presidency, then-Senator Barack
Obama promised a new Iran approach by engaging “in aggressive personal
diplomacy.” 112 Once in office, President Obama stated that the United States “wants the
Islamic Republic of Iran to take its rightful place in the community of nations,” however
and doing so would require engagement that addresses the concerns the U.S. and
international community have about Iran. 113
Currently, the Obama administration continues to carry over this dual policy of
preventing Iran from becoming a nuclear weapons state, while seeking out opportunities
to strengthen ties between the two nations. While President Obama remains adamant
about preventing Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, he has said, “[America’s]
concerns will remain with respect to…[Iran’s] sponsorship of terrorism, its support for
proxies who destabilize the Middle East, its threats against America’s friends and
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allies…We will remain vigilant in countering those actions and standing with our
allies.”114
The Islamic Republic has a long history in the region and has now become a more
influential state that has the opportunity to support or challenge America’s strategy in the
Gulf. Today, a majority of Americans (84%) have an unfavorable view of Iran and say
the development of nuclear weapons by Iran is a “critical threat” (88%).115 These views
underscore the importance of assuring Iran abides by the recently negotiated JCPOA to
thaw relations, while also ensuring U.S. interests in the Middle East remain secured.

Iranian Foreign Policy in the Middle East
The Islamic Republic, a Shiite state, resides in a region dominated by Sunnigoverned nations. Because Tehran’s religious and revolutionary philosophy is
contradictory to the ideals of its neighbors, Iran sees itself as an ideological rival with the
GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia.116
Although Iran’s ideal goal is to insert pro-Iranian, Shiite governments across the
Middle East, however, it is likely that Iran understands the goal may not be attainable. A
large majority of the Middle East is Sunni and with there being a deep divide between
Sunni and Shiite Muslims, along with the fear of Iranian regional hegemony, it will be
difficult for Tehran to successfully influence Shiite populations that leads to additional
pro-Iranian Shiite governments in Sunni Arab states. In addition, the U.S. has sought to
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maintain a balance of power among the Middle East countries where no one country has
the military capabilities to dominate all the other states, but more importantly ensuring
that its Arab allies and Israel maintain a stronger position militarily and geopolitically to
counter Iran’s aggressive and threatening posture. Despite these challenges, Iran has
shown successes in broadening its influence in certain parts of the Middle East such as
Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, which will be discussed later in this chapter.
Because of the challenges to Iran’s expansionist policies posed by the United
States and its Gulf partners, Iran’s Middle East policy is reactive and flexible, where Iran
seeks to further its influence in response to a crisis to achieve its regional goals. 117 If
opportunities arise for Tehran to exert its influence through political, economic, or
military means, then recent history has shown Iran’s ability to do so with relative
effectiveness. Two examples of Iran’s willingness to exploit its foreign policy goals from
regional crises include the Syrian civil war and the current fight against ISIS in Iraq and
Syria. In Syria, Iran has strengthened its strategic partnership with the Assad
government, who allows Iran to use Syria as a conduit to fund and arm Hezbollah in
Lebanon and Islamist groups in Palestine. As for Iraq, the battle against ISIS has enabled
Tehran to become closer with the government in Baghdad, while supporting Shiite
factions to further sectarian violence in Iraq.
In addition to the U.S., there are Sunni Arabs who see these and other actions by
Tehran as steps toward Iran’s goal of dominating the Middle East. For instance, there
were those in Iraq and neighboring Jordan who feared that Iran was trying to influence
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the 2005 Iraqi elections to create an Islamic government that would dramatically shift the
geopolitical balance between Shiite and Sunni Muslims in the Middle East. Jordanian
King Abdullah worried that, “If Iraq goes Islamic republic, then, yes, we've opened
ourselves to a whole set of new problems that will not be limited to the borders of
Iraq.”118 More specifically, King Abdullah, along with other Sunni Arab elites, feared
that Iran’s presence in the Iraqi elections would lead to what is referred to as the Shiite
crescent; the idea that Iran will engage the masses in the region, build an ideological belt
of sympathetic Shiite governments and political factions in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and the
Gulf region, and then expand its regional role and influence.119 While Iran has an interest
in building support among the populaces in all parts of the Middle East, this paper will
examine how Iranian and U.S. policy differ in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen, areas
where Iran views as most strategically vital to reaching its regional ambitions.

Iraq
The United States and Iran have both invested a great deal of time and resources
to maintain influence over the Iraqi government and population. For the United States, it
has been heavily involved in Iraq since the end of the Cold War and still remains
committed to the country’s stability. Iran, who saw Iraq as a security threat until Saddam
was no longer in power, has also been active in strengthening its influence in Iraq. In
post-Saddam Iraq, Tehran has worked to become an ally of Iraq’s government, led by a
Shiite prime minister, as well as project its influence within the local Shiite populations
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in Iraq. After the United States’ withdrawal of combat troops from Iraq in December
2011, Washington has primarily used soft power to project influence in Iraq to help
Baghdad sustain its security and internal stability. Soft power, as described by Dr.
Joseph Nye of Harvard University, is “the ability to get what you want through attraction
rather than coercion or payments,” which includes shaping the attitudes and preferences
of others.120 The Strategic Framework Agreement signed in 2008 between the U.S. and
Iraq outlined a strategy focused on U.S. soft power by having both sides commit to a
long-term relationship that would “contribute to the strengthening and development of
democracy in Iraq, as well as ensuring that Iraq will assume full responsibility for its
security, the safety of its people, and maintaining peace within Iraq and among the
countries of the region.”121
Another example of U.S. soft power is EducationUSA, a free service providing
interested Iraqi students with information about how to apply to U.S. colleges and
universities, which reached an all-time high in 2014 in the number of Iraqi students
studying in the U.S.122 Since the re-emergence of the Islamic State in early 2014,
formerly known as the al Qaeda in Iraq after the U.S. went into Iraq in 2003, the United
States has been implementing more military-based tactics to support Iraqi forces in
countering the advances of ISIS militants.
The United States has several core interests in Iraq. These interests, which were
also put forth in the Strategic Framework Agreement, align with American values and
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look to improve the security situation in the Middle East. As stated by Brett McGurk,
Deputy Assistant Secretary for Iraq and Iran in the Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs,
during a 2013 hearing in front of the Subcommittee on the Middle East and North Africa,
U.S. policy toward Iraq includes:
1. Maintaining a unified and federal Iraq;
2. Supporting increases in production and export of oil resources;
3. Promoting Iraq’s strategic independence and regional integration;
4. Countering the re-emergence of al Qaida in Iraq (AQI), and;
5. Supporting Iraq’s democratic institutions and trajectory. 123
These goals remain applicable to Iraq today, however, the fourth goal is now
focused on efforts to “degrade and ultimately destroy” ISIS.124 The success of each of
these goals heavily depends on one another. For example, defeating the Islamic State
will require Iraq to become more unified through the establishment of democratic
institutions that represent all sects of the Iraqi people.
Iraq is over three-quarters Arab with the rest of the population consisting of
Kurds, and the religious divide being nearly three Shiites for every one Sunni. 125 Even
after the removal of Saddam, tensions between Sunnis and Shiites have continued. The
United States has chosen to support all factions in Iraq, however, Iran clearly aligns itself
with Shiites in Iraq which has increased the potential for future sectarian violence after
ISIS is defeated and expelled from Iraq. Iran’s efforts to counter ISIS in Iraq have been
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viewed both as a concern, but also a potential benefit. In a Senate Armed Services
Committee in March 2015, Joint Chief of Staff Gen. Martin Dempsey said Tehran’s role
in aiding pro-Iranian Shiites could be “a positive thing,” although he and Secretary of
Defense Ashton Carter spoke of their concerns that Iran’s actions could worsen
sectarianism in Iraq.126 Iranian involvement in the fight against ISIS in Iraq is a clear
indication about the worries the U.S. has about Tehran strengthening Shiite groups in
order to gain control of Sunni-populated regions across Iraq.
Since the United States removed Saddam from power, Iran has sought to ensure
that Iraq does not again present a military threat to Iranians as it did for decades prior to
2003. When evaluating Iran’s policy toward Iraq, Iran’s two strategic objectives have
been “to help the formation of an Iranian-friendly government in Baghdad, and second, to
prevent the country from regaining the military clout of the Ba‘athist era or serving as a
launching pad for possible U.S. or Israeli military strikes.” 127 Both of these objectives
coincide with what Iran believes is in its foreign policy interests. What can be seen as a
third goal, or a means to achieving greater influence in Baghdad, is stopping the military
campaign by the Islamic State. In pursuit of these objectives, Iran has continued to
promote sectarian politics, while ensuring that Western influences do not dominate Iran’s
strategy in influencing Iraqi political affairs.
According to some experts, such as former Ambassador Ryan Crocker, Iran’s
meddling in Iraq is part of a three-state partition strategy where Iran could influence
Kurds in the north to align with Tehran, implement a puppet regime in a “Shiastan” in the
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south, and then use a central state populated with radical Sunnis as a tool to warrant the
sending in of their radical Shia militias, precisely to foster this permanent rupture of the
unitary Iraqi state.128 In the view of the Iranian leadership, a divided Iraqi government
favors Iran’s interests and allows Tehran to exert its influence on its Arab neighbor. Iran
favors an Iraq with a Shia-majority leadership, and to achieve that goal, Iran has pursued
sectarian strategies to promote unity among Iraq’s Shia political groups; including
funding Shia parties, encouraging them to run as a single coalition during past elections,
influencing sectarian identity politics, and advocating a political process polarized along
sectarian lines.129
Iran welcomed and supported former Shia Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki and his
new government in 2006, most likely to grow close to the new Iraqi leader. In a postSaddam Iraq, Iran saw an opportunity to transform the Iraqi political system to one that
would befriend Tehran. To some extent, one can state that Maliki accepted its close ties
with the Islamic Republic to help him and his coalition maintain power in Iraq. In
addition, Maliki supported many of Iran’s goals in the Middle East.
For instance, while in power, the Maliki government played a part in assisting
Iran in its support for the Assad government in Syria. Maliki allowed Iran to use Iraqi
airspace to send military equipment to Syria to help strengthen Assad’s forces during his
country’s ongoing civil war.130 This issue was addressed again by the United States
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during newly-appointed Secretary of State John Kerry’s first trip to Iraq, since the U.S.
knew Iraq continued to assist Iranian efforts to arm the Assad regime. 131 Also, Iraq has
been reluctant to enforce stringent rules relating to international sanctions placed on Iran
for its clandestine nuclear program activity.
As reported by the New York Times in 2012, the United States acknowledged that
Iraqi officials, some of whom where close to Prime Minister Maliki, turned a blind eye in
allowing Iraq to be a network of financial institutions and oil-smuggling operations that
were providing Tehran with a crucial flow of dollars.132 One entity that helped Iran’s
ability to circumvent sanctions was the Elaf Islamic Bank in Iraq. The Elaf Islamic Bank
would participate in the Iraq Central Bank’s daily auction where commercial banks could
sell Iraqi dinars and buy U.S. dollars. Through these auctions, customers of Iran were
able to move large amounts of cash from there into banks in regional financial centers
such as Dubai, United Arab Emirates, or Amman, Jordan, and then into the international
banking system. These types of transactions were “worth tens of millions of dollars with
the Export Development Bank of Iran” from 2011-12, according to the United States
Treasury Department.133
In May 2013 the United States lifted its sanctions134 from the Iraqi bank, as the
bank ended its actions that were violations under the Comprehensive Iran Sanctions,
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Accountability, and Divestment Act of 2010.135 Although some progress has been made
to stop Iraq’s assistance to help Tehran circumvent sanctions, it can be clearly seen that
Iraq has been used as a loophole for the Iranian regime to pursue its destabilizing
policies.
Since Iranian President Hassan Rouhani entered into office in August 2013,
Tehran has looked to strengthen its relations with Baghdad. Rouhani, viewed by some as
more pragmatic than his predecessor, has taken efforts to engage with Iraqi leaders.
Within a month after the Joint Plan of Action was agreed upon between the world powers
and Iran, then-Prime Minister Maliki visited Tehran in December 2013. As described by
Rouhani’s website, the Iranian president “described Tehran’s ties with neighboring Iraq
as strategic, calling for long-term development of mutual ties in all fields.”136
In today’s international fight against the Islamic State, Iran has become a key
partner for the Iraqi government to protect key Iraqi cities and strategic points. When
Iraqi security forces fled after ISIS militants entered Iraq to capture several large cities
last summer, Iran was one of the first nations to send support to Baghdad. 137 ISIS is also
a threat for Iran, as an unstable Iraq dominated by ISIS and other Sunni Islamists would
be a major security concern for Iran.
The threat of the Islamic State and its advancements in Iraq have warranted Iran’s
increasing role in helping protect Baghdad. Soon after the second-largest Iraqi city of
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Mosul fell to ISIS fighters in early June 2014, Iran deployed units from its Revolutionary
Guard Corps to Iraq.138 According to Iranian security officials, two units were dispatched
from Iran's western border provinces and tasked with protecting Baghdad and the holy
Shiite cities of Karbala and Naja.139
Although the United States also has played an integral role in helping Iraq push
back ISIS fighters, there are Iraqi officials who feel the U.S. could have assisted sooner.
According to General Qassem Atta, head of the Iraqi National Intelligence Service,
“From the first day we sent a request to the Americans for training and weapons…The
U.S. excuse for not sending it [help] was to wait for the new government to be
established. We had no choice...but to go to Iran. We had to defend ourselves.”140
Since June of last year, Iran has provided additional military support through
training Shiite factions supported by Baghdad, weapons shipments from Iran, and actual
air strikes to counter the advancements of ISIS fighters. According to one Iraqi
government official, Tehran has sold Iraq nearly $10 billion worth of weapons and
hardware, mostly weapons for urban warfare like assault rifles, heavy machine-guns and
rocket launchers.141 Iranian military assistance to Iraqi forces has been helpful in
allowing the Iraqi military to regain some strength and attempt to fight back ISIS, which
is required if Iraq hopes to recapture the territory once lost to the militants. Even
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Chairman Gen. Martin Dempsey believes Iran’s support in Iraq to fight ISIS is fine and
that “it will only be a problem if it results in sectarianism.”142
Not only has Iran provided direct support to the Iraqi government and its security
forces, but Iran’s assistance to Shiite militias in Iraq has been crucial to thwarting the
efforts of the Islamic State in Iraq. Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, an Iraqi cleric, last
summer called on Iraqi citizens who were “able to bear arms and fight terrorists,
defending their country and their people and their holy places” to “volunteer and join the
security forces to achieve this holy purpose.”143 As a result, the Popular Mobilization
Forces (PMF), as they are known, were formed which include a number of Shiite militias
directly supported by Iran.
These militias that are enabling the government of Iraq to push back ISIS also
include fighters who attacked and killed U.S. troops during the invasion of Iraq a decade
ago. Although the security of Iraq is an objective for the United States, there is a worry
that the growing clout of the militias will cause sectarian violence in an Iraqi controlled
mostly by Shiites after the Islamic State is defeated. In essence, Iraq would become
similar to what Lebanon is today, a weak government heavily controlled by a pro-Iranian
Shiite movement.
With the Shiite militias gaining momentum in Iraq, which has been aided by
airstrikes from the U.S. and its international partners, some militia leaders do not feel the
need for the U.S. to assist in the fight against the Islamic State. Many analysts believe
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that the Shiite militias “don’t want the Americans there and they never did,” which
displays the growing role of Iran inside Iraq.144 These Iraqi militias have close ties to
Iran and believe that Iranian support is only needed to defeat ISIS. As Karim al-Nouri,
spokesman and military commander for the Badr Organization, one of the most dominant
Shiite militias in Iraq, said, “We don’t need [the U.S.], either on the ground or in the
air…We can defeat the Islamic State on our own.” 145
While the rise of the Islamic State has required military support from the U.S. and
Iran, it has also invigorated Iranian influence in Iraq in two ways. The first being that the
ISIS threat has mobilized the Iraqi Shiite community, which has allowed Iran to take
advantage of an opportunity to reintegrate its influence in Iraq. Secondly, the Islamic
State’s advancements have allowed Iranian advisers to manage Shiite militias in Iraq and
to some extent Iraqi military forces. In all, Iran has taken advantage of a regional crisis
to further its expansionist goals in the Middle East by increasing its footprint in Iraq and
demonstrating its ability to assist Iraqis in preserving their security.
However, it must be mentioned that not all those in Iraq support Iran’s growing
influence and their regional ambitions throughout the Middle East. For instance, there
are Shiites in Iraq who do not support Iranian concepts such as an Islamic revolution or a
religious Supreme Leader as a nation’s top decision-maker.146 In addition, Iraqi Sunnis
tend to view Iranian influence in their country negatively, as they fear Iran’s increasing
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involvement in Iraq will foster Shiite groups to seek control of Sunni-majority towns.147
The Popular Mobilization Forces, filled with pro-Iranian Shiites, are assisting Sunni
towns by driving back ISIS fighters, however, there have been many instances where
these Shiites militias have then committed war crimes against Iraqi Sunnis in revenge of
ISIS attacks on Shiites.148
Additionally, many Iraqi Kurds are not supportive of the pro-Iranian Shiite
militias’ role in fighting the Islamic State. Kurdish fighters have fought alongside with
the Popular Mobilization Forces, although their alliance has been uneasy as the Kurds
feel the Shiites will contest with them for control over northern Iraq.149 The Kurds are
worried that Shiite militias will look to control northern Iraqi cities, like Kirkuk, after
they have been liberated from ISIS control. This negative perception of the PMF,
whether or not they are backed by Iran, can become a source of increasing sectarian
violence that may lead to a civil war within Iraq once the ISIS threat has diminished.
The future of U.S. and Iranian policy in Iraq may be shaped by what happens with
the ISIS threat and how much each state will commit to establishing a stronger internal
security force to protect Iraqis. ISIS is unlikely to be either destroyed or pushed out of
Iraq anytime soon, thus the United States and Iran will continue their military support to
Baghdad. For the near-term, it seems likely the U.S. will extend its military assistance
through the administration’s current plan of airstrikes targeting ISIS and training Iraqi
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forces.150 In concert, Iran has pursued a stronger security relationship with Iraq over the
past year, but also has used the Islamic State crisis to strengthen Shiite factions in Iraq.
Tehran has continued to maintain closer relations with Baghdad, one example
being a military pact signed between the two states at the end of 2014. The agreement
will allow Iran to continue to train Iraqi units in the fight against the Islamic State.
According to Iraqi Defense Minister Khalid al-Obeidi, Iraq assumes “Iran’s increased
support for the Iraqi armed forces as a strategic necessity.” 151 The success of the Iranianbacked Shiite militias in Iraq, along with the cultural ties between Tehran and Baghdad,
have allowed Iran to implant itself into a stronger role to influence the future of Iraq.
Even if Iraq and Iran become closer allies as a result of the fight against ISIS, this
is not to say the United States will no longer be relevant to Iraq. In major security crises
like the one with the Islamic State, Iraq will likely ask for U.S. assistance as its military
capabilities far surpass those of Iran. Thus, an American role in Iraq’s future security
will unlikely enable Iran to form an ideal government in Baghdad that rejects the United
States. Iran has settled in knowing that Iraqi leadership will rely on the U.S. in certain
scenarios, but Iran has built itself to be a strategic partner to influence policy in Baghdad.
In order for the United States to achieve its goals in Iraq and prevent Iran from
reducing American influence in Baghdad, it will have to take necessary steps to build an
enduring strategic partnership with Iraq that displays its commitment to Iraq’s long-term
stability and security. Developing a strategy built with transparency, integrity, and
content can allow the U.S. to counter Iranian influence in Iraq through assisting the Iraqi
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forces in fighting against ISIS and helping Iraq to becoming an independent state.152
Several actions include arming and training Sunni tribal forces to fight against ISIS
militants,153 while also strengthening United States Agency for International
Development (USAID) programs aimed at helping Iraqis improve the effectiveness of
their government and civil society. 154 Additionally, the use of Foreign Military Financing
(FMF) and the Iraq Train and Equip Fund (ITEF) to provide training and equipment to
support the long-term development of the Iraqi Security Forces can also be impactful in
building internal Iraqi structures capable of defending their homeland without Iranian
interference and limiting Iran’s influence within Iraq’s security apparatus. 155

Syria
Despite the ongoing civil war that has fostered one of the largest humanitarian
crises of this generation and allowed multiple militarized Islamist groups to expand their
territory, Syria is another example of where the U.S. and Iran have policies in the Levant
where the goals of both sides contradict each another. Syria has been a strategic ally of
Iran for over 30 years and remains a critical element of Iran’s goal to shape a favorable
security situation in Lebanon and along Israel’s northern frontier. In contrast, the U.S.
sees an unstable Syria with an illegitimate government who is allied with Iran as a threat
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to U.S. interests as well as the security of Israel and Arab partners. Because Iran needs
Syria to act as “a major conduit for Iranian arms shipments and material support to
Lebanon’s Hezbollah” and “to influence the situation in Lebanon and in the Arab-Israeli
arena,” the U.S. has sought to reorient Syria’s role as Iran’s gateway to the Levant. 156
The history of U.S. policy toward Syria prior to the current conflict included
either confrontation or engagement. During the Cold War, the United States engaged
with a hostile Syrian regime as it was viewed geopolitically important to ensure that
Damascus did not fall under Soviet influence. The post-Cold War era has included
engaging with Syria in helping resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict, but also confrontation
where the U.S. labeled Syria as part of the “axis of evil” and sought ways to isolate the
Assad regime from the international community. This confrontational approach has led
to deeper ties between Syria and Iran, as Iran-Syrian relations depend more on the two
sides’ common strategic threat perceptions, posed by the United States and Israel, rather
than the Shiite origins of their ruling elites.
The United States would ideally like to see the removal of the Assad regime and
its replacement with a more democratic, pro-Western government. The civil war in
Syria, although a horrific humanitarian crisis which has created nearly 4 million refugees
according to a report by the European Commission, has not required the same attention as
what is happening in Iraq and the nuclear deal with Iran.157 America’s goal in Syria is “to
provide diplomatic support and a robust training and equipment program to moderate
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elements of the Syrian opposition” while “enforcing strict economic sanctions against
Damascus” with international partners.158
The Obama administration’s approach to Syria currently involves denouncing the
Assad regime’s brutal crackdown of its citizens and pushing for a stable, democratic
government through advocating for international consensus on future steps to end the
Syrian civil war159 and aiding anti-Assad rebels to fight against Islamic extremists and
Assad’s forces.160 While the United States would like to see the Assad regime be
removed from power, it seems that goal will require an international response. Therefore,
the U.S. has focused most of its current efforts in Syria on airstrikes targeted at the
Islamic State and other terrorist groups, 161 while training Syrian rebels to fight against
Assad’s military forces and Islamic extremists. 162
The Iranian regime sees Syria as a strategic component of its broader policy in the
Middle East that contradicts America’s regional strategy. As stated by Randa Slim, a
Director at the Middle East Institute, 163 and other academics,164 Iran’s policy in Syria is
driven by several factors: defending an old ally who has supported Tehran since the 1979
revolution, preserving a weapons conduit to Hezbollah, fighting against the Sunni anti-
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extremist coalition whose aim is to weaken Iraq and Syria, and preventing the
establishment of a Sunni or anti-Shiite regime if Assad falls from power. Particularly
since the beginning of Syria’s civil war in 2011, Iran has devoted significant financial
and military assistance to preserve Assad’s power.
Iran’s relations with Syria today rely on common interests and threats, specifically
the U.S., its Gulf partners, and Israel. However, Syria and Iran have had a partnership
since Iran’s revolution in 1979. In the 1980s, Syria was the only Arab state to support
Iran during its eight-year war with Iraq and allowed Iran to send Islamic Revolutionary
Guard Corps forces to a Syrian-held town in Lebanon to support fledging Shiite militants,
which was the precursor to Hezbollah, during Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. While Syria
does not necessarily provide direct support in protecting the survival of the Iranian
regime, Assad’s government is helpful in allowing Tehran to further its regional
ambitions in exchange for Iranian support to protect the leadership in Damascus.
Since the calls for Assad’s removal from the U.S. and other countries after the
Syrian protests in 2011, Iran has invested many resources to ensure its strategic ally
remains in power. Financially, Iran has granted Syria two lines of credit at a total of $4.6
billion to help purchase petroleum products and other goods. 165 The fuel that Syria is
able to import allows Assad’s forces to continue fighting against terrorist organizations
and anti-Assad rebel groups in Syria.
In addition, Iran and its Lebanese proxy Hezbollah have provided the Assad
regime with significant military support to fend off Sunni extremists and rebel groups in
Syria. While the number of exact fighters sent by Iran to Syria are difficult to determine,
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it is estimated that at least 100 IRGC members and more than 1,000 Hezbollah fighters
have been killed in Syria since the civil war began. 166 Besides Iran sending its own
soldiers and proxies to assist Assad, Tehran also helped established the National Defense
Force, a militia consisting of many Assad loyalists, mainly Alawites (a Shiite sect). 167
Despite U.S. and Gulf states’ efforts to help the Syrian rebels, Iran’s excessive support
for the Assad regime and its military forces have hampered America’s strategy to assist
the anti-Assad factions in the Syrian civil war.
The Iranian regime has been able to exploit its Syrian policy to further its interests
in the region. From Iran’s perspective, its strategy has paid off thus far for several
reasons. First, Assad, who is arguably the only ally of Iran in the region, is still in power
and is beholden to Tehran and Hezbollah forces fighting for his survival. Second, the
international community has become more focused on the threat of the Islamic State than
the atrocities occurring in Syria. For many Gulf states and the U.S., the Islamic State is
perceived as more of a threat than a dictator who has a waning military and is staying
afloat with the help of Iran. In the fall of 2014, President Obama stated in an interview
that the threat of ISIS is a “more immediate concern” than confronting Syrian Bashar alAssad and his regime.168 Finally, Iran’s policy in Syria has led it to gain ground in the
Golan Heights to threaten Israel.
The Golan Heights contain both Israelis and Syrians citizens and provides Israel
with a strategic vantage point that makes Damascus visible. Syria and Israel have fought
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over the Golan Heights many times, but what is more worrying for Israel, thus a concern
for the U.S., is if Iran and Hezbollah gain access to the land. Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu spoke of Iran as seeking to open a “third front” against Israel;
Hezbollah fighters are already north of Israel in Lebanon, Hamas located in Gaza, and
now Iran directing Hezbollah in the Golan Heights. 169 This perceived encirclement is
viewed as threatening to Israel’s security, as an Iranian success in the Golan Heights
could provide Tehran with a strategic deterrent against its main enemy in the region.
For the near-term, is seems Iran will continue to put forth resources to support the
survival of the Assad regime whose position in power worsens the stability in the Middle
East by allowing Iran to pursue its hegemonic ideals and threat the security of the Syrian
people and U.S. allies in the region. For Iran, there appears to be no alternative to Assad,
but Iran will likely do what is necessary to ensure Syria remains pro-Iranian and available
to transport soldiers and weapons to Hezbollah and Palestinian terror groups.
As could be seen since the start of the Syrian civil war, Iran has exerted a greater
influential role in shaping the environment in Syria than the U.S. While the United States
sees the future of Syria as important in achieving its overarching objectives in the Middle
East, Iran has been dominant in upholding its allies within Syria to ensure the Assad
government remains in power. Recently, the United States has begun its military
program to train Syrian rebels in Jordan, which had been delayed for almost two
months.170 However, as stated by Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter, the rebels “are
being trained and equipped to fight ISIL” and not the Assad regime. 171
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Just as in Iraq, Iran has put forth efforts to arm groups to help defeat ISIS fighters,
while also furthering instability in the Middle East for its own advantage. It seems Iran is
also using Syria and the threat of ISIS to its advantage, where it can act as a state fighting
against the Islamic State while drawing attention away from its support of the Assad
regime. According to the State Department’s most recent report on sponsors of terrorism,
the Iranian regime continues “to provide arms, financing, training, and the facilitation of
primarily Iraqi Shia and Afghan fighters to support the Asad regime’s brutal crackdown”
and Syria as a crucial causeway in its weapons supply route to Hezbollah, while Iran
conducts operations against ISIS. 172

Lebanon
The third country that presents Iran’s strategic threat to Middle East security that
is to be examined in this paper is Lebanon. The United States sees the need for a strong
bilateral relationship with Lebanon to cooperate on regional security, intelligence sharing,
and dealing with emerging and common threats from militant groups inspired by al
Qaeda with operational links to Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. For Iran, their relationship with
Lebanon centers around its support for Hezbollah, which includes providing the Lebanese
militant group with weapons to use South Lebanon as a launch pad for missiles and other
operations against Israel. The battle for influence in Lebanon cannot be overlooked by
the U.S., as Lebanon is a key state in furthering regional security politics.
The United States has used diplomacy and foreign aid to help keep Lebanon
stable and out of Iranian control. Since the end of the brief Israel-Hezbollah war in 2006,

172

“Country Reports on Terrorism 2014.” U.S. Department of State. Page 285. June 2015.
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/239631.pdf.

57

Congress has appropriated over $1 billion to support U.S. policies designed to extend
Lebanese security forces’ control over the country and promote economic growth. 173
With Lebanon’s long history of sectarianism mixed with political violence, and impact of
regional unrest and the Syrian civil war, it has been challenging for the U.S. to assist
Lebanon to prevent further uncertainties.
Since Syria withdrew its forces from Lebanon in 2005, the United States has
sought to “maintain its traditionally close ties with Lebanon, and to help preserve its
independence, sovereignty, national unity, and territorial integrity.” 174 The United States
does not want Lebanon to become another arena for proxy competition, but Iran’s
proactive role in Lebanon since 2005 has made that goal challenging for Washington.
Because of America’s push to preserve its strategic interests in Lebanon, Iran has
chosen to divert a great deal of effort toward challenging the U.S. for influence in
Lebanon and to use Lebanon as a means of disrupting America’s strategic and political
interests in the broader Levant. Furthermore, in Lebanon, Iran wants to secure its
regional hegemonic interests and continue to influence the Arab-Israeli conflict as means
of shoring up its broader regional position in a mainly Sunni Arab Middle East. 175
U.S. and Iranian strategies to extend their influence over Lebanon, along with the
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, have played an impact in
the emergence of two cross-confessional political groups; the March 14 Alliance and
March 8 Alliance. March 14 includes a majority of Lebanon’s Sunni population and is a
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pro-U.S. and pro-Western coalition. In contrast, March 8 heavily supports Iran and the
Assad regime and consists of mostly Shiite-sectarian political forces. Sectarian divides
are currently present not only in Beirut’s politics, but also among the Lebanese
population. The United States and Iran have sought to use their supported factions in
Lebanon to strengthen their influence Beirut’s political environment.
One area where the U.S. has sought to top Iranian influence in Lebanon is by
aiding the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF). The United States has decided to support its
allies in Lebanon, particularly the March 14 Alliance, to weaken both Iranian and Syrian
influence in Lebanon but also to build Lebanon’s national military to confront terrorist
groups. Hezbollah is already well-integrated into Lebanese politics and has significant
military capabilities, which is worrisome for the America, pro-U.S. factions in Lebanon,
and Israel if the Syrian conflict spills over to Lebanon and creates further instability.
The United States has put forward considerable investment in helping build up
Lebanon’s military in order to legitimize Beirut’s security forces as capable of protecting
the Lebanese population. Providing support to Lebanon’s military and protecting the
Lebanese population can strengthen U.S. support in Lebanon. Despite America’s
military aid, which has totaled to over $700 million since 2005, there has been limited
impact on the balance of forces between the LAF and Hezbollah or shaping positive local
perceptions of American efforts in Lebanon.176 Several challenges have been presented
by the U.S. in fulfilling its objectives in strengthening the efficacy of the LAF.
First, sectarianism in Lebanon has made its civil-military dynamics an obstacle to
develop a coherent national defense strategy to sustain Lebanon’s future security,
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especially during the Syrian crisis where the LAF has walked a fine line on the conflict,
seeking to secure the “least bad common denominator” interests of Lebanon’s competing
communities by limiting the risk of escalating violence.177 Additionally, it is unclear as
what U.S. military assistance in the future will look like. The growing threat of ISIS in
Syria, the need to maintain Israel’s qualitative military edge in an increasingly dangerous
Levant, and Congress’s skepticism about the effectiveness of aid to the LAF may impact
America’s future approach toward Lebanon.
The U.S. has also used the Special Tribunal for Lebanon (STL) as part of its
strategy to limit Iranian influence in Beirut by indicting members of Hezbollah and its
allies who are supported by Tehran and attempt to limit justice in Lebanon. The STL was
established in 2007 “to hold trials for the people accused of carrying out the attack of 14
February 2005 which killed 22 people, including the former prime minister of Lebanon,
Rafiq Hariri.”178 In addition, the United States helped create the STL in the hope of
finding Syria culpable of Prime Minister Hariri’s death, thereby weakening Syria’s
regional role and strengthening the position of Lebanese allies of the West in Beirut.
Lebanese perception of the Tribunal is difficult to assess, as some reports state a majority
of Lebanese support 179 the initiative with others state the opposite.180 Because America is
viewed unfavorably in Lebanon, and its association with the Tribunal, the STL may be a
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less effective tool in garnering more U.S. influence in Beirut.181 The prospects of civil
strife in Syria and security spillover effects in Lebanon, along with Iran and its allies’
discrediting of the STL, the focus for U.S. policy-makers will likely be on the impact of
Syria’s crisis on Lebanon rather than furthering the efficacy of the Tribunal.
As with Iraq and Syria, Lebanon will likely continue to be an area where Iran’s
foreign policy attempts to weaken U.S. strategy in the Middle East. Both countries have
strategic interests in Beirut, where the U.S. seeks to support pro-U.S. Lebanese factions
to confront Iranian-backed groups and Iran has used its resources to influence Lebanon in
promoting its expansionist policies throughout the Levant.
Unfortunately for the U.S., its military assistance has produced limited results in
helping the LAF demonstrate their ability to defend Lebanon’s borders. Consequently,
there have been instances within the last few years where Iran’s proxy in Hezbollah has
cooperated with the LAF in border security and other operations. 182 This cooperation has
created a double-edge sword by creating a stronger bond between the LAF and
Hezbollah, while reinforcing Sunni suspicions that the LAF is becoming dominated by
Hezbollah and other Shiite elements in Lebanon.
The future of Lebanon’s stability and U.S. and Iranian policy aimed at projecting
influence will likely be impacted by the outcome in Syria. The longer the Syrian civil
war persists, the more important it will be for the U.S. and its coalition partners to
minimize future spillover effects from what may be years of instability in the Levant.
The humanitarian crisis has already flooded Lebanon with over a million refugees.
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Washington should continue to support the LAF to ensure it is capable of protecting
Lebanon if ISIS militants seek to expand throughout the Levant. On the other hand,
Hezbollah needs the Assad government to remain in power in order to act as a supply line
for military aid from Iran. Otherwise, Assad’s fall would place Hezbollah at a significant
disadvantage in the event of another conflict with Israel.
Hezbollah, with the support of Iran, is expected to remain Lebanon’s most
organized political and military force that aims to support its Shiite constituencies and
characterize itself as a resistance movement against international efforts to shape
Lebanese affairs. To maintain its commitment to counter Iranian and Hezbollah
influence in Lebanon, the United States should continue to bolster and support the LAF
and take necessary actions to prevent a spillover of the Syrian conflict into Lebanon.

Yemen
The fourth Middle East area to be analyzed in this paper supporting Iran’s foreign
policy as threatening to U.S. Middle East strategy and Gulf security is Yemen. In the
past year, Iran has become increasingly involved in Yemeni affairs, specifically with
Iran’s support for the Houthi rebels who are seeking more government power. 183 What
became a cause for concern for the U.S. in Yemen, a country that President Obama touted
as a model of success for counterterrorism,184 occurred when Houthi rebels seized a

183

The Houthis are a Shiite insurgency group that originated from northwestern Yemen's Saada province as part of
the Shabab al-Mumanin (the Believing Youth), a group that operated in the early 1990s. The Believing Youth
worked to raise awareness about the Zaidi branch of Shiite Islam, which had dominated Yemen for centuries but was
repressed by the Yemeni government after its civil war in the 1960s.
184 “Statement by the President on ISIL.” The White House. 10 Sept. 2014. https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-pressoffice/2014/09/10/statement-president-isil-1.

62

significant portion of Yemen’s capital of Sanaa in September 2014.185 Since then, the
Houthis have disrupted the political transition that was sponsored by the GCC and backed
by the U.S. three years ago by threatening to intensify Yemen’s internal conflicts. 186
As a result of Houthi advancements, which have been possible with military
assistance from Iran, the Yemeni government that includes the U.S.-backed Yemeni
president in Abd-Rabbu Mansour Hadi and his cabinet have been pushed out of Yemen
by the Houthis and lack any authoritative power in much of the state.187 Currently
President Hadi has sought refuge in Saudi Arabia, while the Saudi military and other
Arab partners conduct a bombing campaign against Houthi rebels. 188
For the United States, Yemen is an important partner in the fight against al Qaeda,
which is why President Obama has authorized over $800 million to be sent to Sanaa since
Yemen’s political transition that led to Hadi becoming the nation’s president in 2011.
Generally, the U.S. has implemented a strategy in Yemen that consists of promoting
political, economic, and security sector reforms supporting the country’s Gulf
Cooperation Council-brokered political transition initiative, while helping confront the
immediate security threat represented by al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula.189
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Although President Hadi has no control over his country, the U.S. says it
continues some of its counterterrorism operations in Yemen,190 but the U.S. has closed its
embassy there and relocated personnel.191 U.S.-Yemeni relations have been focused
primarily on combating terrorist threats in Yemen, however, it seems that more U.S.
efforts to support the Hadi government are needed to also prevent Tehran from
establishing a pro-Iranian leadership in Yemen. It is beneficial to the United States to
support President Hadi, who has been recognized as Yemen’s leader through the Peace
and National Partnership Agreement signed in Yemen in September 2014.192 Allowing
the Houthis to gain more control of Yemen is worrisome because while it would be a
positive step if the Houthis were to agree upon the 2014 Agreement, there are concerns
that Iran’s continued support for the Houthis could create “a state within a state” that acts
in contrast to U.S. interests in Yemen.193
The instability in Yemen has presented the U.S. with a formidable
counterterrorism challenge. The current fight for power between the Houthis and Hadi
supporters should not hinder America’s policy of “helping the government confront the
immediate security threat represented by [al Qaeda].”194 In addition to using drone
strikes and other military capabilities to target jihadists, the U.S. will have to work with
its international partners and political parties in Yemen to ensure the southern Gulf state

190

Nissenbaum, Dion. “U.S. Confirms Military Withdrawal From Yemen.” The Wall Street Journal. 22 Mar. 2015.
http://www.wsj.com/articles/u-s-confirms-special-operations-forces-withdrawal-from-yemen-1427046997.
191 Ghobari, Mohammed. “United States Closes Its Embassy in Conflict-hit Yemen.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters. 10
Feb. 2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/02/10/us-yemen-security-usa-idUSKBN0LE25720150210.
192 “Secretary-General Welcomes Signing of Peace, National Partnership Agreement in Yemen, Expects Its
Implementation without Delay.” UN News Center. United Nations. 21 Sept. 2014.
http://www.un.org/press/en/2014/sgsm16168.doc.htm.
193 Sharp, Jeremy. “Yemen: Background and U.S. Relations.” Federation of American Scientists. Congressional
Research Service. Page 6. 11 Feb. 2015. https://fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RL34170.pdf.
194 “Testimony of Janet Sanderson, Deputy Assistant Secretary, Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs, Senate Foreign
Relations Committee: U.S. Policy in Yemen.” U.S. Department of State. 19 July 2011.
http://www.state.gov/p/nea/rls/rm/168850.htm.

64

does not fall into the hands of jihadists who seek to attack the U.S. and allied states in the
Middle East. However, divesting too many resources in Yemen to confront Iran’s
influence is not recommended, as Yemen is “not consequential enough to justify making
any American investment there.”195 While the U.S. calls upon all parties “to participate
peacefully in Yemen’s transition process…to build an inclusive system of governance
that ensures a stable and prosperous future for all Yemenis,” it will be difficult to
implement such a transition as post-Qaddafi Libya has shown.196
For Iran, the crisis in Yemen has presented another opportunity for the clerical
regime to expand its influence in an attempt to strengthen Shia populations in the region.
Iran’s support for the Houthis has included money, training, and weapons, all of which is
aimed at weakening U.S. and Saudi goals in Yemen. To put it more directly, Iran’s
activity in Yemen has sought to counter American and Saudi influence in determining the
future of Sanaa. As one Iranian official had put it, “Everything is about the balance of
power in the region. Iran wants a powerful Shi'ite presence in the region that is why it
has got involved in Yemen as well.”197
An example of Iran’s attempt to influence Yemeni internal stability, although
unsuccessful, occurred in 2013.198 According to several sources, an Iranian vessel was
intercepted off the coast of Yemen containing weapons including Russian-designed SAM
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2 and SAM 3 anti-aircraft missiles. The U.S. Navy and the Government of Yemen then
escorted the vessel to Aden where it was turned over to the Yemeni Coast Guard. This
attempt at arming Shiite militias to spur internal power struggles between the Houthis and
Yemeni government demonstrates the “ever pernicious Iranian meddling in other
countries in the region,” according to a U.S. official.199
More recently, the Iranian regime has attempted to support Houthis through arms
shipments, but was unable to do so as the United States intervened. Because news
sources stated in April that Iran may be shipping weapons to the Houthis via a convoy of
nine cargo ships, the U.S. responded by sending the aircraft carrier USS Theodore
Roosevelt and the guided-missile cruiser USS Normandy to the Arabian Sea.200 As a
result, the Iranian convoy was forced to turn around and headed back to Iran. 201 The
increased readiness of U.S. naval presence in the Gulf may become a more effective tool
in preserving America’s interests and power in the Middle East for the near future.
What is troubling about Iran’s involvement in Yemen is that it may produce
another strong, pro-Iranian force near the border of Saudi Arabia, one of America’s top
Gulf strategic partners. In January of this year, Ali Shirazi, the Supreme Leader’s
representative to the Quds force, told the Iranian press that the Houthis are “similar” to
Hezbollah in Lebanon.202 While having a Hezbollah-type militant group in Yemen
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would be a strategically important asset to Iran as it can provide a counterforce to its
archrival in Saudi Arabia, the likelihood of Iran gaining similar net advantages with the
Houthis as it does with Hezbollah is dubious.
There have been disagreements between the Houthis and Iran in terms of how to
move forward with the current situation in Yemen.203 Also, the religious connection Iran
has with the Houthis has little influence toward any potential Islamic revolution in
Yemen, as there are religious differences between Houthis and Iranians.204 Therefore, it
is unlikely that Iran will have the same level of influence over the Houthis as it does with
Hezbollah in Lebanon or Shiite militias in Iraq. 205
Yemen has become the most recent example of Iran’s pursuit to challenge U.S.
strategy in the Middle East in order to strengthen its regional influence. As stated earlier
in this paper, Iran regularly uses regional crises as an avenue to further its regional goals
and project greater influence. With Yemen, religious conflict and sectarian have brought
the Gulf state to the brink of another civil war, while Iran has been vocal about its support
for a political solution in Yemen in order to prevent a similar situation in Syria from
happening in Yemen.206 It is too soon to tell how the crisis in Yemen will unfold, but it
may be in Iran’s favor to continue its support for the Houthis to maintain its alliance.
While stability in Iraq and Syria continues to be in jeopardy, it is likely that both
Iran and the United States will place Yemen as a secondary concern. Both states hope to

203

Watkins, Ali, Ryan Grim, and Akbar Shahid Ahmed. “Iran Warned Houthis Against Yemen Takeover.” The
Huffington Post. 20 Apr. 2015. http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2015/04/20/iran-houthis-yemen_n_7101456.html.
204 Orkaby, Asher. “Houthi Who?” Foreign Affairs. 25 Mar. 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/middleeast/2015-03-25/houthi-who.
205 Adelkhah, Nima. “Iranian Perspectives on Yemen’s Houthis.” The Jamestown Foundation. 26 June 2015.
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/tm/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=44082&cHash=0c227d3195cfc9c32e17c0
b039bd01a4#.VZ_Wrv_JCtV.
206 Hafezi, Parisa. “Iran Calls for Yemen Talks, Says Long-term Peace Possible.” Reuters. Thomson Reuters. 22 Apr.
2015. http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/22/us-yemen-security-iran-zarif-idUSKBN0ND0FW20150422.

67

maintain their interests and influence within Yemen, but the threat of ISIS has shown to
be more of a priority. However, it is probable that the United States and Iran will
continue to put forth efforts to alter the outcome of Yemen’s crisis, in addition to possibly
halting the Saudi-led military campaign against the Houthi rebels.
The U.S. has continued to use its naval forces to block Iran’s weapons shipments
to Houthi fighters, while also supporting Saudi Arabia and others in the current military
bombing campaign, which has resonated negatively with the Yemeni populace. Iran
remains committed to aiding Houthi rebels, although denies doing so, and regularly calls
for a peaceful solution to end the bombing and fighting. However, while Iran’s military
support is a threat to American allies, the U.S. strategy in Yemen is “not accurately
diagnosing the problem and therefore not prescribing the right solution or the right kind
of assistance strategy that would really respond to the needs on the ground,” which
includes address the pervasive lack of economic opportunity, structural unemployment,
cronyism, and the inequitable distribution of state resources, according to Atlantic
Council analyst Danya Greenfield.207 Even if Iraq and Syria continue to draw more
resources from the U.S. and Iran, Yemen will likely remain an area where the two rivaled
states attempt to project influence and alter the regional order of the Middle East.

Conclusion
Iran has shown its willingness and effectiveness to use a variety of strategies to
further its interests in the Middle East. Iran’s influence in the region is growing and has
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become a major concern for many in the U.S. Government, including defense and
intelligence officials. For instance, Director of National Intelligence James Clapper
testified at a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing:
“The way that Iran is exerting its influence…is a combination of
intelligence and special ops, has extensive commercial enterprise
businesses…And so they use that as their instrumentality, as they are now
in Iraq, for extending their influence as one of their proxies. And, of
course, another one of their proxies is Hezbollah, which they've had a long
client-subordinate relationship with.”208
As discussed in this chapter, Iran has demonstrated its ability to engage and
influence the internal affairs of selected nations in the Middle East. In Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, and Yemen, the Iranian regime has instituted soft and hard power capabilities
to expand its influence, while seeking to minimize any interference by the U.S.
However, Iran has also been active in other countries in the Middle East as well; such as
Afghanistan, Bahrain, and Egypt. While the Iranian regime has taken action to project its
influence during times of crisis in the region, Tehran has also spoken of strengthening the
relationships with its regional neighbors.
When President Rouhani began his time in office, he acknowledged his hope to
become partners with Arab countries in the region in order to find regional, multilateral
solutions to today’s crises in the Middle East. As Foreign Minister Zarif wrote in
Foreign Affairs last year, President Rouhani’s foreign policy “aims to move Iran away
from confrontation and toward dialogue, constructive interaction, and understanding, all
with an eye to safeguarding national security, elevating the stature of Iran, and achieving
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long-term comprehensive development.”209 Although such a platform would be
welcomed by the U.S., Israel, and Arab countries, Iran’s interference in Arab states
across the region, along with its vociferous rhetoric discussing Tehran’s hegemonic
goals, have made it difficult for anyone to believe transition toward a less hostile Iran can
occur. During this year’s Quds Day in Iran which celebrates the condemnation of Israel
and support for the Palestinian people, the Armed Forces General Staff said:
“There is no doubt that the strategic depth of the message of the Islamic
Revolution outlined the formation of Islamic vigilance and resistance [has]
manifested in the context of the resistance epic and miraculous victories
[in] recent years of Lebanese Hezbollah and Hamas of Palestine, and in
the new scenes of Ansar Allah [the al Houthis] in Yemen and the popular
resistance of Iraq and Syria.”210
Iran’s regional ambitions and the actions it has taken to achieve these aims have
presented a threat to U.S. allies in the Middle East. In addition to Iran’s meddling in the
Middle East and support for multiple terrorist groups, the dangers surrounding Tehran’s
nuclear program have added to the concerns that Israel and Gulf states have about Iran’s
regional intentions. Although the U.S. and its allies do not want to see Iran develop
nuclear weapons, there are also worries about, as Matthew Kroenig, a fellow at the
Atlantic Council, says, “If Iran gets major sanctions relief... that will mean more money
flowing into Iranian coffers and a windfall Iran can use to step up its influence in the
region even more.”211 Since the beginning of the nuclear talks nearly a decade and a half
ago, the Gulf states have increased their military spending far more than Iran, likely to
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preserve its ability to counter Iran’s future destabilizing activities and threats and lessen
the effectiveness of any future attack on them by Iran. 212 To understand how the Iranian
nuclear program presents a strategic challenge to the U.S. and its regional allies in the
Middle East, it is necessary to analyze Tehran’s nuclear capabilities.
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CHAPTER 3: IRAN’S NUCLEAR PROGRAM AND ITS POTENTIAL IMPACT
ON MIDDLE EAST SECURITY

For years, the Iranian leadership has stated that its nuclear program is being used
for peaceful purposes with no intent of developing nuclear weapons. The reference to
Ayatollah Khamenei’s longstanding nuclear fatwa is commonly made by political leaders
in Tehran to validate the nature of their nuclear program. The website for its nuclear
program, generated by the Iranian government, has a section devoted to the fatwa against
nuclear weapons as well.213 Although Iran’s Supreme Leader has reiterated the fatwa on
several occasions, there is question to the validity of the pronouncement and fear that Iran
may seek nuclear weapons in the future if it deems it necessary to their security.
There are still concerns about Iran not having answered all the lingering questions
the IAEA and the P5+1 have about Iran’s past nuclear activities. The National
Intelligence Estimate (NIE) of 2007 report published by the Office of the Director of
National Intelligence on Iran’s nuclear capabilities did state that Iran ended its nuclear
weapons program in the fall of 2003, however, the unsettled issues regarding Iran’s
nuclear program are worrisome for many countries in the Gulf and around the world.214
To understand why Iran’s neighbors, the U.S., and others are troubled over Iran’s nuclear
program and how it will impact future U.S. policy in the Middle East, it is important to
recognize the program’s history and technical capabilities.
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The Development of Iran’s Nuclear Program
The Iranian nuclear program began under the Shah in the 1950s when Iran started
receiving assistance through the U.S. Atoms for Peace program under the Eisenhower
administration. In 1967, the U.S. supplied the Tehran Nuclear Research Center with a
small 5MWt research reactor, fueled by highly enriched uranium (HEU).215 Iran then
signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state
(NNWS) in 1968 and ratified the Treaty in 1970. States who sign the Treaty are bound
by numerous commitments, one being their fulfillment of a safeguards agreement with
the IAEA.216 Such an agreement is an essential component to ensuring nonproliferation
among the NNWS, as it outlines the specific requirements Iran must abide by as a
signatory of the Treaty to verify its peaceful use of nuclear energy as a NNWS.
On May 15, 1974, Iran and the Agency agreed to a comprehensive safeguards
agreement, as standardized through the model agreement laid out in Informational
Circular (INFCIRC)/153. As set forth in INFCIRC/153, following the language in
Article III, paragraph 1 of the NPT, the basic obligation of the state is “to accept
safeguards…with the [IAEA]…for the exclusive purpose of verification of the fulfillment
of its obligations assumed under this Treaty with a view to preventing diversion of
nuclear energy from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.”217 This allows IAEA inspectors to verify the presence of all nuclear material
declared by the inspected state and ensure that there is no undeclared nuclear material. In
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order for the IAEA to correctly verify all present nuclear material within a state, the state
must provide all information about the quantity and quality of all nuclear material.
Additionally, INFCIRC/153 states that a country shall “establish and maintain a
system of accounting for and control of all nuclear material subject to safeguards under
the Agreement…to enable the Agency to verify…that there has been no diversion of
nuclear material from peaceful uses to nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive
devices.”218 An issue for the world powers has been Iran’s lack of transparency with the
IAEA, specifically its absence of reporting all nuclear material subject to safeguards.
Article 62 of INFCIRC/153 requests that the state provide the Agency with a full report
of all nuclear material to ensure the state’s correctness of information.219 Correctness
refers to providing accurate information on all nuclear material in a nation state.
Correctness however is not the sole component of proper verification; there needs to be
completeness, in that a state must not be withholding any nuclear material in its report
that is under safeguards.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, much of the work on Iran’s nuclear program
came to a halt.220 The end of the Iran-Iraq War began a renewed focus on Tehran’s
nuclear technology acquisition in the 1980s and 1990s. For example, Iran signed longterm nuclear cooperation agreements with Pakistan and China, in 1987 and 1990
respectively. Iran then signed a bilateral agreement with Russia in the 1992, which then
led to the finished construction of the Bushehr Power Plant.221
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Not only did Iran engage in open nuclear activities to strengthen its energy
infrastructure, Tehran also attempted to learn more about developing nuclear weapons.
The founder of Pakistan’s nuclear program, A.Q. Khan, and his nuclear proliferation
network had sold Iran a complete set of P-2 centrifuge blueprints in 1996, which Iran
used when it began constructing and testing P-2 centrifuges in 2002.222 Although large
parts of its program were openly known by the international community, Iran proved its
ability to construct covert facilities within its borders. It was not until mid-2002 when the
IAEA and the rest of the world realized that Iran had a clandestine enrichment plant,
which was just one of many unreported activities of Iran’s nuclear program.

Iran’s Non-Compliance with the NPT and IAEA
In August 2002, the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI) made an
announcement that surprised the IAEA and the world.223 The NCRI revealed that Iran
had a gas centrifuge enrichment plant at Natanz, a heavy water production plant under
construction at Arak, and Kalaye Electric Company was being used as a front company
for the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran.224 After these discoveries, IAEA inspectors
visited Iranian facilities and officials, which led to Iran agreeing to sign the Additional
Protocol and suspend enrichment. Because Iran’s new declaration contradicted the
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Agency’s previous information on its nuclear program, the IAEA sought to take all
necessary measures to confirm Iran’s past and present nuclear activities.
The revelation of the Natanz facility presented questions as to whether Iran had
violated its obligations under the NPT. As written in the safeguards agreement between
Iran and the Agency, INFCIRC/214, “design information in respect of existing facilities
shall be provided to the Agency during the discussion of the Subsidiary
Arrangements...as early as possible before nuclear material is introduced into a new
facility.” 225 The 1976 version of Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements that was part
of Iran’s safeguards agreement stipulated it must provide facility design information “as
early as possible, and in any event not later than 180 days before the receipt of any
nuclear material at the facility concerned.”226 Since Natanz had not received nuclear
material by August 2002, it is difficult to demonstrate Iran’s breach of this provision.
However, the failure to provide design information is inconsistent with the general
obligation to provide this information as early as possible.
In 2003, Iran agreed to be bound by modified Code 3.1, which required that design
information should be provided to the IAEA “as soon as the decision to construct or to
authorize construction has been taken.”227 Were Iran bound by modified Code 3.1 in
2002, the failure to declare the Natanz facility would have been constituted as a breach.
Iran then stopped its implementation of modified Code 3.1 in March 2007 and said it
would revert to the implementation of the 1976 version of Code 3.1. Nonetheless, the
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Director General stated in a report in 2007 that “Article 39 of Iran’s Safeguards
Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be modified unilaterally; nor is there
a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in
Subsidiary Arrangements.”228
The main dilemma regarding Iran’s nuclear program involves its allege nuclear
weapons development-related activities at military sites in the past, or what has been
commonly referred to in IAEA reports as possible military dimensions (PMDs). In a
November 2011 IAEA report, 12 areas of concern were noted by the Agency as issues
that need to be resolved in order to verify Iran’s peaceful nuclear intentions.229 Iran
initially rebuffed the Agency’s request to visit Parchin, the facility many believe is where
nuclear weapons experiments have taken place, but granted access to parts of the
complex in 2005. Since 2005, the IAEA remains vigilant in its efforts to visit the
remainder of the Parchin nuclear site and other areas of concern to prove or disprove any
possible military dimensions of Iran’s nuclear program.
Prior to the signing of the JCPOA, Iran agreed to a Framework of Cooperation
with the Agency which required Iran to implement practical measures to answer issues
that the IAEA has about Iran’s nuclear program’s history. 230 Although Iran has made
progress in implementing the measures laid out in the first two steps, it still “has not
provided any explanations that enable the Agency to clarify the two outstanding practical
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measures relating to the initiation of high explosives and to neutron transport
calculations.”231 As part of the JCPOA, Iran has agreed to “fully implement the
‘Roadmap for Clarification of Past and Present Outstanding Issues’ agreed with the
IAEA” by October 15, 2015.232

Iran’s Justification of its “Right” to Enrich
The Iranian regime has repeatedly spoken out about the country’s right to develop
peaceful nuclear energy under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since it began
nuclear negotiations over a decade ago. Iran references Article IV of the Treaty to justify
its enrichment activities and why the United States and others cannot impede on its
nuclear program.233 Iran says that Article IV clearly states its inherent right to enrich,
however, the United States and others believe that the NPT does not explicitly state such
a right. As a senior official to the Obama administration said the day of the agreement of
the 2013 interim nuclear deal, Article IV “is silent on the issue. It neither confers a right
nor denies a right. So we don't believe it is inherently there.”234 The United States
continues to support this position, but it can be argued that allowing Iran to resume its
enrichment activities as a result of the JCPOA shows the Obama administration’s
acceptance of this right to enrich.
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The Joint Plan of Action
What was widely seen as a diplomatic breakthrough, the Joint Plan of Action
(JPOA) laid the foundation for what the international community hopes is a harbinger for
a long-term nuclear deal between the world powers and Iran. The agreement aimed “to
reach a mutually-agreed long-term comprehensive solution that would ensure Iran's
nuclear program will be exclusively peaceful” and “would enable Iran to fully enjoy its
right to nuclear energy for peaceful purposes under the relevant articles of the NPT.” 235
The JPOA, agreed upon by the P5+1 on November 24, 2013 in Geneva, was originally a
six-month accord that was to lead to a lasting comprehensive deal, but was extended until
November 24, 2014 as both sides were unable to resolve all outstanding issues.
Within the agreement, there is a list of concessions from both the world powers
and the Islamic Republic. Of the list of mandates towards Iran, the most notable are
Iran’s pledge to dilute half of its 20% enriched UF6 stocks to uranium oxide with
enrichment below 5% and convert the other half to 20% enriched uranium oxides; to not
enrich uranium over 5%; and to not make any further advances of its activities at the
Natanz Fuel Enrichment Plant, Fordow, or the Arak reactor.236 In return, the P5+1, or
EU/E+3 as it is stated in the agreement, agreed to suspend sanctions on a several sectors
of Iran’s economy, to not pass any new nuclear-related UNSC resolutions, to enable
repatriation of frozen funds overseas to Iran.
From January 20th to July 20th 2014, Iran was seen to have complied with many of
the steps it agreed upon back in November. Iran’s compliance with the agreed upon steps
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in the Joint Plan of Action relied upon verification measures taken up by the IAEA. In
the JPOA, Iran agreed to take several measures that would increase its “breakout time,”
or the time it would take for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon. At the beginning of the
six-month term, the IAEA issued a report stating Iran’s accordance with the Joint Plan of
Action. Several of the most notable points made in the document included the Agency’s
confirmation that Iran had ceased enriching uranium over 5% U-235, began diluting UF6
enriched up to 20% U-235 into U3O8, continued to construct a power plant to convert UF6
up to 5% U-235 to oxide, continued safeguarded research and development practices
which were not designed to accumulate enrichment production.237
In addition to these actions by the Islamic Republic, the IAEA’s report also
highlighted the fact that Iran sent written communications to the Agency in relation to its
“voluntary measures” under the JPOA. These letters from Iran detailed how there would
be no new location for enrichment other than those already existing at the Fordow and
Natanz sites, that will not engage in stages of reprocessing activities, or construction of a
facility capable of reprocessing, and that there is no reconversion line to reconvert
uranium oxide enriched up to 20% U-235 back into UF6 enriched up to 20% U-235.238
It is also important to note that besides Iran’s interim agreement with the world
powers, Iran agreed upon measures to strengthen cooperation with the IAEA. This
agreement, known as the Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation, was signed
by the Director General of the IAEA and Vice President of Iran on November 13, 2013.
Both parties agreed on the statement in pursuit of strengthening “their cooperation and
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dialogue aimed at ensuring the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear programme”
in order to address all outstanding issues that the IAEA has not been able to resolve.239
Such an agreement with the Agency presumed that Iran will cooperate to resolve
all past and present issues surrounding its nuclear program and do so in a timely manner.
Also, the Agency agreed to take into account Iran’s national security in regards to
information Iran sees as confidential. However, the IAEA and its safeguards practices
explicitly state what activities or facilities are included in these practices, but it does not
guarantee Iran will comply. This framework is a key component to the verification of
Iran’s nuclear program, as it is the IAEA who provides greater assurance to the world if
Iran has or will divert its program towards nuclear weapons.

Framework for a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
What was deemed as a “historic understanding with Iran” on April 2, 2015, the
P5+1 and Iran agreed on a foundation for which the final text of the Joint Comprehensive
Plan of Action (JCPOA) was written.240 The decided framework addressed many issues
of concern regarding Iran’s nuclear program, from its future enrichment capacity to
inspections at Iran’s nuclear facilities. In addition, the lifting of sanctions was addressed
where Iran would receive sanctions relief, if it verifiably abides by its commitments
stated in a final deal. From the fact sheet provided by the State Department shortly after
the framework was announced, several noticeable provisions included:
-

Iran has agreed to go from having about 19,000 installed centrifuges
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today to 6,104 installed under the deal, with only 5,060 of these
enriching uranium for 10 years. All 6,104 centrifuges will be IR-1s,
Iran’s first-generation centrifuge;
-

Iran has agreed to not enrich uranium over 3.67% for at least 15 years;

-

The IAEA will have regular access to all of Iran’s nuclear facilities,
including to Iran’s enrichment facility at Natanz and its former
enrichment facility at Fordow, and including the use of the most up-todate, modern monitoring technologies;

-

Iran has agreed to implement the Additional Protocol and modified
Code 3.1 and;

-

Iran will ship all of its spent fuel from the reactor out of the country
for the reactor’s lifetime.241

While the State Department’s fact sheet provides hope for a comprehensive deal,
it should be noted that the U.S. and Iran provided different accounts as to what the
framework entailed. Several days after the framework was established, the Iranian
government produced a statement detailing how it interpreted the parameters of a final
agreement. For instance, Iran’s statement believed all sanctions would be immediately
removed after the implementation of a deal, that Iran will “voluntarily” abide by the
Additional Protocol, and research and development with its advanced centrifuges would
continue.242 Despite the different accounts of what the framework entailed, the world
powers and Iran were able to achieve a comprehensive nuclear agreement in July 2015.
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Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action
On July 14th, 2015, the P5+1 and Iran agreed upon a landmark nuclear deal called
the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action aimed to end Iran’s potential path toward the
development of nuclear weapons. According to President Obama, “America negotiated
from a position of strength and principle” and because of this deal, “the international
community will be able to verify that the Islamic Republic of Iran will not develop a
nuclear weapon.”243 The 159-page document with five Annexes includes the basic
provision of the deal, sanctions relief, and steps toward allowing the IAEA to verify the
peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear program.244
On the day the agreement was reached, the White House published on its website
the parameters of the deal. Several of the key provisions of the agreement include:
-

the JCPOA will produce the comprehensive lifting of all UNSC
sanctions as well as multilateral and national sanctions related to
Iran’s nuclear program;

-

a Joint Commission consisting of the P5+1 and Iran will be
established to monitor the implementation of this JCPOA;

-

Iran will keep its level of uranium enrichment at up to 3.67% at a
total of 300kg for 15 years;

-

Iran is required to redesign its Arak heavy water research reactor to
prevent weapons-grade plutonium production;
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-

Iran will cooperate with the IAEA to address all past and present
issues of concern relating to its nuclear program;

-

The UN Security Council resolution endorsing the JCPOA will
terminate all the provisions of the previous UN Security Council
resolutions on the Iranian nuclear issue simultaneously with the
IAEA-verified implementation of agreed nuclear-related measures by
Iran and will establish specific restrictions, and;

-

U.S. and EU economic and financial sanctions will be terminated
simultaneously with IAEA-verified implementation of agreed
nuclear-related measures by Iran.245

Although an agreement has been made by all parties of the nuclear talks, the
deal will not be in effect until all participants endorse the deal. The most notable states
whose domestic political systems may interfere with the endorsement of the JCPOA are
the United States and Iran. For the U.S., Congress has 60 days to review and accept the
agreement as law, according to Iran Nuclear Agreement Review Act of 2015 that was
passed in April.246 In Iran, its parliament, known as the Majlis, has the task of
reviewing the deal, but does not vote on it. The Supreme Leader ultimately has the
final decision in whether or not to endorse the agreement. Despite opposition of the
deal from Iranian hardliners, it is likely that the Supreme Leader will likely base his
judgment on what the U.S. Congress decides in order to provide him with more options.
For instance, congressional rejection “might be a better scenario for the Supreme Leader
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because it would give him an excuse to prolong the process without Iran taking the
blame.”247
Whether or not politicians from the U.S. and Iran oppose the nuclear deal, its
endorsement will likely have a significant impact on the regional security environment
of the Middle East. Just as before a deal was finalized, U.S. allies in the Middle East
continue to be cautious about the impact the deal with have on regional security. In the
section that follows, it will be discussed how the JCPOA could potentially affect the
Middle East, specifically regarding the security of Israel and the states of the Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Bahrain, UAE, Qatar, and Oman).

Potential Security Implications for the Middle East
The JCPOA could have profound implications for the Middle East, particularly
for Israel and the GCC states. On the one hand, the Iran nuclear agreement, if
successfully implemented, removes the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran and has the
potential to lower regional tensions. On the other hand, the sanctions relief of the JCPOA
will presumably increase the economic resources available to Iran to promote its interests
in the region, such as improving its defense capabilities and financing pro-Iranian
terrorist groups both of which are inimical to the interests of the United States and its
allies. In either case, it seems that what is more important is how U.S. allies will respond
to the deal rather than the elements of the deal itself.
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At the moment, it can be said that Iran feels comfortable about the status quo. As
stated earlier in this paper, Iran’s Shia allies are dominant in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and
Yemen. Because Iran has poured significant amount of resources to its allies in these
states, it is likely that Tehran will devote a small, but significant, amount of the total
funds it will receive from formerly blocked bank accounts as a result of the JCPOA to
enhance its conventional military capabilities.
While there are critics of the Iran deal who believe Iran will increase its spending
on supporting its terrorist and proxy groups by billions of dollars in the near-term, this
may not be probable due to Iran’s domestic economic issues.248 Recent numbers show
that while Iran’s inflation rate has dropped in half in the past two years because of the
sanctions relief under the JPOA, Iran continues to struggle with its unemployment rate of
over 13% and its aging population.249 Because of Iran’s economic issues, it is plausible
that Iran will use the windfall to address its domestic needs, especially if oil prices remain
low. In addition to Iran’s potential focus on addressing its internal economic problems,
Iran is unlikely to expend billions of dollars instantly on funding its expansionist policies
in the Middle East because such activities are already effective with their current budget.
As previously stated in this paper, Iran has been able to display its efficacy in projecting
influence across the Middle East, even under the conditions of stringent global sanctions.
Iran’s meddling in the region through propping up its terrorist and proxy forces and
supporting the Assad regime in Syria, has been somewhat inexpensive in comparison to
Iran’s overall gross domestic product (GDP). In 2014, Iran’s GDP totaled at just over
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$400 billion, which accounted for 3% growth from 2013.250 While Iran’s economy
staggered and now is beginning to recover, the Islamic Republic has been able to fund its
inexpensive war in the meantime. According to some experts:
“Iranian support for sectarian militias in Iraq and Syria, even the highest
estimates -- $300 monthly salaries for 140,000 militia members plus
another $900 per month each for arms and sustenance -- amount to only
$2 billion annually. Propping up Syria's Assad regime may require a few
billion dollars a year, but much of Iran's funding to date has been in the
form of oil it could not otherwise easily sell (because of sanctions and
poor market conditions), not cash. Tehran's numerous other operations in
Iraq and Syria -- from bribery to humanitarian aid -- may cost another $12 billion.”251
Whether or not Iran chooses not to spend significant amounts of its unfrozen
financial toward funding its proxy allies in the region, it is likely Iran will devote a small
(in relative terms) amount of its now accessible hard currency to improving its
conventional military capabilities.
In addition to endorsing the Iran nuclear deal, the United Nations Security
Council also passed UNSC Resolution 2231. UNSCR 2231 bans arms transfers by Iran
without the permission of the UN Security Council until the ban is lifted in five years. 252
Because Iran has rejected the interpretation and legal standing of the resolution, it is
probable that Iran will try and acquire major weapons systems from foreign sellers. 253
One example where Iran may test the provisions of the UNSCR and impose its
interpretation of the resolution on the international community is the Russian S-300
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surface-to-air missile system that Iran originally signed a contract to purchase in 2007 but
Russia then pulled out in 2010 due to international pressure.254
Other potential implications of the nuclear deal are that Iran may look to continue
to improve its missile program and conventional military weaponry in order to strengthen
its defenses at home and to support its proxies and troops throughout the region. As
stated in UNSCR 2231, the ban on arms transfers to Iran expires five years after
“Adoption Day,” or the day when the nuclear deal is officially adopted by all parties. If
the conflicts in Iraq and Syria are still occurring after five years, Iran is likely to seek
advanced munitions, armored vehicles, attack helicopters, and ground support aircraft for
its allies, proxies, and its own forces fighting in Syria and Iraq.
Additionally, UNSCR 2231 calls upon Iran to avoid the testing and development
of ballistic missiles designed to be capable of delivering nuclear weapons for eight years
after “Adoption Day,” although there is no prescribed penalty for it continuing with such
activities.255 While the resolution does mention the development and testing of ballistic
missiles, it is silent on cruise missiles. It is difficult to assess how UNSCR 2231 will
impact Iran’s missile program. However, the ambiguous context of the resolution, along
with the influx of funds due to the unfreezing of Iranian overseas accounts, Iran may use
its new cash “to pay off the middle-men and fund the various legal and illicit entities that
make such proscribed transfers possible” while making “continued incremental progress
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with its liquid- and solid-fuel MRBM and ICBM programs for the duration of UNSCR
2231.”256
In addition to Iran’s potential activity as a result of the JCPOA, it is important to
analyze the potential responses of U.S. regional allies. One country’s reaction that was
highly predictable was Israel’s. As expected based upon Israel’s past of opposing Iran
retaining any level of nuclear infrastructure, Prime Minister Netanyahu quickly opposed
the nuclear deal the same day it was announced by stating that the “world is a much more
dangerous place.”257
If Iran chooses to continue its current policies in the Middle East even after the
nuclear deal is enforced, the more important potential implication is the Iranian belief that
America’s behavior after the agreement will be interpreted as a sign of further
disengagement of the Middle East. Thus, as Kenneth Pollack of The Brookings
Institution stated during a Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearing, “the most
important variable in Iranian regional behavior after a deal may well prove to be the U.S.
reaction, rather than anything derived from Iranian strategy or politics itself.”258

Conclusion
When Barack Obama became president in 2009, he sought to amend the relations
between the U.S. and Iran, in order to address the concerns surrounding Iran’s nuclear
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program. At the onset, President Obama publicly spoke of his goal to engage with the
political leaders of Iran. To put words into action, the U.S. brokered a deal in 2009 that
would have “required [Iran] to send about three-quarters of its current known stockpile of
low-enriched uranium to Russia to be processed and returned for use in a reactor in
Tehran used to make medical isotopes.”259 Tehran originally accepted the deal, but then
rejected the proposal as some politicians in Iran disapproved of sending Iranian uranium
out of the country.
The Obama administration then began a dual-track policy by keeping engagement
as a possibility, while pushing for new sanctions. In the end, the U.S. worked with allies
to create a new sanctions package to apply additional pressure on Iran, specifically UNSC
Resolution 1929.260 However, the presidential election of Hassan Rouhani changed the
focus, shape, and approach to U.S. and Iranian diplomatic negotiations.
In June 2013, Hassan Rouhani became the next president of the Islamic Republic
who looked to reintegrate Iran into the international community. President Rouhani
wanted to revive the Iranian economy and to do so required the lifting of sanctions placed
on the Islamic Republic from the U.S. and UN Security Council. Since the phone call
between Presidents Obama and Rouhani in September 2013 after the UN General
Assembly, diplomatic relations between the two nations have been at its highest point
since the 1979 Revolution.261
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Because the U.S., and the rest of the world powers, have changed their stance on
Iran’s uranium enrichment capacity over the past six years, from not allowing Iran to
enrich to accepting limited enrichment, the U.S. needs to develop a strategy that copes
with this transformation. With Iran pursuing destabilizing regional ambitions in the
Middle East that represent a strategic threat to American interests and allies, it is
recommended that the U.S. reevaluate its Middle East policy to assure that Iran does not
use sanctions relief and remaining nuclear energy capacity to expand its revolutionary
agenda throughout the region. Thus, the U.S. should update its Middle East policy that
adapts to Iran playing a larger regional role without conceding any U.S. interests or
weakening alliances. The following chapter will discuss recommendations to do so.
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RECOMMENDATIONS AND CONCLUSION

The recent nuclear deal between the world powers and Iran will likely have an
impact on America’s future strategy in the Middle East. As stated earlier, several of
America’s allies continue to be concerned over Iran’s intentions in the region, some of
which are more worried that the nuclear deal will allow Iran to spend more resources
towards its regional ambitions. Whether or not Iran willfully abides by its commitments
written in the JCPOA, the United States should be prepared to adjust its policy in the
Middle East that factors in potential increased spending by Iran toward modernizing its
military capabilities and supporting Shia factions.
To preserve a dominant American role, the United States should not trade
temporary nuclear cooperation for acquiescence to Iranian hegemony in the Middle East.
As discussed earlier in the paper, Iran has used its political, economic, and military
capabilities to project influence in Iraq, Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Because each of
these four conflicts includes different levels of Iranian influence, the United States will
have to develop separate strategies toward each conflict-driven state to further weaken
Iranian influence in the region and again project America’s support toward its regional
allies. However, the U.S. should have each strategy aim towards reaching its regional
goals of maintaining a regional balance of power, securing the free flow of oil in the
region; and defeating Islamist terror groups in the region. Thus, the United States should
implement a holistic doctrine using all elements of national power, particularly based on
offshore balancing while also pursuing military assistance and training programs to
demonstrate its commitment to the security of Israel and Gulf allies and prevent Iran from
weakening America’s position in the region.
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Preserving the Security of GCC Allies Through an Artful Balance
The basic principle of any future U.S. force posture in the Gulf should include the
continuation of U.S. military access to the Gulf. This is the bedrock of the U.S.-GCC
military alliance and the principal reason the Gulf states still look to the United States as
their main strategic partner. From the reflagging of Kuwaiti tankers and U.S. naval
operations against Iran’s naval forces in the late 1980s to the massive military investment
in driving out Iraq’s forces from Kuwait and deterring their return throughout the 1990s,
the U.S. military has demonstrated itself as a military ally to its Gulf partners.262 The
Gulf is a region of strategic importance to the United States and its security environment
has evolved since the 1980s and 1990s, which is why revamping America’s approach to
the region is necessary to include the future growing role of Iran in the Middle East.
As outlined in a report by the Atlantic Council earlier this year, the pillars of U.S.
defense strategy in the Gulf as it relates to Iran are deterrence, preventing Iran from
acquiring nuclear weapons, containing its regional reach, and deterring it from attacking
or coercing its neighbors; reassurance, comforting Gulf allies that a nuclear deal with
Iran would not give Tehran license to expand its destabilizing influence in the region,
while retaining America’s robust military capabilities in the Gulf; counterterrorism,
weakening and destroying Islamist extremists who threaten the U.S. and its allies; and
political development, which ranges from modest political opening to fundamental
nation-building.263

262

Armacost, Michael H. “U.S. Policy in the Persian Gulf and Kuwaiti Reflagging.” Defense Technical Information
Center. Page 13. 1987. www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA496911.
263 Saab, Bilal Y., and Barry Pavel. “Artful Balance: Future US Defense Strategy and Force Posture in the Gulf.”
Atlantic Council. Mar. 2015. http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/images/publications/ACUS_ArtfulBalance_WEB.pdf.

93

Because Iran poses a multidimensional challenge, directly through its contentious
nuclear program and evolving missile arsenal and other weapons systems, and indirectly
through local, non-state proxies, the United States should seek to find the right balance to
address these challenges. This approach should include the means to deter Iran from
attacking and coercing its neighbors, which may be done through Iran potentially
acquiring nuclear weapons and Iran increasing the use of its asymmetric threats.
For instance, it is recommended that the United States implement an offshore
balance approach in the Gulf region that focuses on the use of air and naval capabilities to
counter threats, while also enhancing its commitment to its GCC allies by bolstering their
defense capabilities through arms sales and military training. These elements can help
the United States develop a balanced strategy to limit the threat posed by Iran, but also
show America’s capability to provide security to the Middle East.
Offshore Balancing. The idea of offshore balancing in the Middle East should
not be interpreted as America’s strategy of abandoning its commitments in a strategic
region vital to U.S. interests. The Middle East comprises of a multitude of security
concerns for the United States; from Iran’s nuclear and asymmetric capabilities to the
threat posed by the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. These challenges of the 21 st century
will require a new and adaptive strategy, which offshore balancing can provide. As
Stephen Walt from Harvard University describes, offshore balancing:
“…is the ideal grand strategy for an era of U.S primacy. It husbands the
power on which U.S. primacy depends and minimizes the fear that U.S.
power provokes. By setting clear priorities and emphasizing reliance on
regional allies, it reduces the danger of being drawn into unnecessary
conflicts and encourages other states to do more to help us. Equally
important, it takes advantage of America’s favorable geopolitical position
and exploits the tendency for regional powers to worry more about each
other than about the United States. But it is not a passive strategy, and
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does not preclude using the full range of U.S. power to advance core
American interests.”264
Thus, offshore balancing in the Middle East would allow the United States to
continue to maintain a balance among the regional powers and intervene when American
interests are at risk. Again, these interests include confronting external aggression
against allies and partners in the region, ensuring the free flow of energy from the region
to the world, dismantling terrorist networks that threaten our people, preventing the
development or use of weapons of mass destruction, and helping create a peaceful,
prosperous, stable and democratic Middle East.265
Implementing an offshore balance of power strategy would require the U.S. to
adjust its current posture in the Middle East. As a global power, the United States should
be involved in the Middle East as it has many strategic interests in the region. However,
many of the region’s conflicts reside from cultural and religious differences that date
back thousands of years. Thus, the United States should assert itself where it believes it
can enhance regional security and not get bogged down fighting the wars of its regional
partners. Accordingly, offshore balancing would have regional powers “bear the primary
responsibility for dealing with crises on the ground,” where U.S. military strategy would
be “oriented toward policing the sea lanes and the skies,” and “direct intervention is
contemplated only when the balance of power is dramatically upset.” 266
The use of offshore balancing in the Middle East will vary between security
issues. Since America is in no position to end the Sunni-Shia conflict in the Middle East,
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offshore balancing is an appropriate strategy that will allow the United States to display
its ability to address other national security concerns in the region. Examples where
acting as an offshore balancer can be effective are towards weakening the Islamic State
threat and Iran’s influence in Iraq and Syria. In the case of the Islamic State in Iraq and
Syria, the United States should find ways to limit ISIS’s ability to flex and recover to
resume offensive attacks and to provide ways to maximize tactical opportunities to
degrade ISIS. Doing so can provide important opportunities to build momentum for antiISIS forces through successive and cumulative tactical victories.
For instance, the U.S. should continue to provide military support from a distance
through airstrikes on ISIS targets, but also do more in bolstering Iraqi armed forces and
pro-Western groups in Syria. Airstrikes should be designed to prevent local ISIS
victories, act against time-sensitive or high-value targets, and prevent mass killings.
Thus, effective airstrikes can “prevent ISIS victories, break its momentum, degrade its
capabilities, and contain the group militarily” and “isolate ISIS’s forces in Iraq and Syria
and prevent them from reinforcing one another, and buy time and space to organize and
grow America’s partners on the ground in Iraq.”267 Conducting an impactful air
campaign can assist other efforts of defeating ISIS, such as training anti-ISIS, proWestern forces in Iraq and Syria who need to take the lead in regaining control of their
territory.
To weaken the Islamic State, the U.S. needs to strengthen its train and assist
mission by placing forward-deployed teams of advisors into the region to help the Iraqi
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security forces and pro-Western rebels fight more effectively. Generating or rebuilding
forces in the rear is not enough, which is why forward-deployed train and assist teams –
such as Special Forces or Rangers – are necessary to spot good combat leaders and warn
against weak, ineffective, or corrupt ones. These teams are needed to provide
intelligence back to the military commanders and strategists that static or inexperienced
pro-Western leaders and units cannot; to be a voice for active patrolling; and to be a
second voice when resupply, reinforcement, regrouping. Plus these train and assist teams
can encourage effective civil-military action, such as in Iraq where Iraqi units have a
different ethnic or sectarian bias or simply think in tactical terms rather than how to
create a local capability to hold, recover, and build at both the military and civil levels.268
In Iraq, some options have been around for several months but have lacked the
resources to be fully implemented. For instance, as stated at a State Department briefing
in May 2015, some elements of a coherent strategy include a program focused on
mobilizing tribal fighters in Anbar, with a streamlined delivery mechanism for weapons,
and developing a national guard law that would provide Iraq with provincial-based
security forces that are decentralized from Baghdad providing governors with more
responsibility to protect their provinces.269 Assisting the Iraqi government and
supporting these programs will help build unity in Iraq, strengthen Iraq’s security forces,
and limit Iran’s influence in Iraq and its central government.
In addition to enhancing its train and assist program, the U.S. should raise the
level of its air support. Presently, America’s air campaign with its allies from across the
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globe has not stopped ISIS from continuing to gain ground in both Iraq and Syria.
Several criticisms of the U.S. coalition’s air campaign have been their exertion of
prudence when it comes to bombing ISIS targets where civilians may be killed and the
targets being hit are not effectively pushing back ISIS. According to an Iraqi army
commander, “We…asked the U.S. coalition to attack ISIS convoys while they were
moving from one place to another, but they either neglected our requests or responded
very late.”270 The U.S. cannot always let civilian casualties avoid them from launching
strikes on ISIS targets, as ISIS will likely continue to use civilians as human shield to
protect themselves and their assets. Plus, placing advisors on the ground with allies in
Iraq and Syria can better allow the U.S. to gain intelligence and identify and strike
strategic targets against ISIS more quickly and effectively and potentially limit civilian
casualties.
As with Iraq and Syria, a more impactful strategy in Lebanon after the Iran
nuclear deal will require bolstering internal state actors friendly to the U.S. inside
Lebanon. The U.S. can cooperate with Saudi Arabia to help strengthen Lebanese security
forces and their ability to better defend Lebanon’s borders against outside threats than
Iran’s proxy in Hezbollah. Developing a more enduring Lebanese security apparatus is
essential to the country’s long-term future, as “Hezbollah’s ongoing participation in Syria
is increasingly making Lebanon a target of Sunni militants, as is the apparent
cooperation/deconfliction between Hezbollah and Beirut in the domestic fight against
ISIS.”271 There are several options the U.S. can pursue to weaken Iran’s influence
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through Hezbollah in Lebanon, while strengthening Lebanon’s internal strength by
creating a stronger Lebanese state apparatus.
For example, America’s assistance in Lebanon must be first tailored to helping
improve the security situation in Lebanon. Specifically, the U.S. “should help the
Lebanese Army in the areas of leadership, soldier training, communications,
organizational skills, and research and development.”272 The U.S. has already shown its
willingness to provide Lebanese security forces with military hardware including Huey II
helicopters273 and Hellfire II missiles, 274 but better training and military-to-military
cooperation can produce more long-term impacts than annual military sales in building
sustainable security forces that are more competent than Hezbollah. Training should also
include the development of Lebanese Training Teams, where U.S. Special Operation
Forces train Lebanese Armed Forces officers to become instructors. Those LAF officers
then teach other Lebanese soldiers while developing leadership experience of their
own.275
In addition to the U.S. cooperating with Lebanon to build a sustainable and
effective military apparatus, Saudi Arabia can play a helpful role in working with
Lebanon’s security forces. Saudi Arabia is keen to see Lebanon’s army defend its
borders against armed groups, particularly ISIS and the al Qaeda-linked Nusra Front,
instead of having Hezbollah fighters do so. Riyadh has also shown its commitment to
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enhancing Beirut’s security capabilities through multiple military grants that have
allowed Lebanon to purchase military equipment from other countries like France and
China.276
Plus, the U.S. needs to have a focus on gaining more allies with Lebanon’s Shiite
community. America’s announcement earlier this year to cancel State Department
Middle East Partnership Initiative (MEPI) funding for “independent” non-Hezbollah
Shiites should be reversed.277 MEPI is needed in Lebanon to offer the Shiite community
assistance, training, and support to groups and individuals striving to create positive
change in the society. Such support can counter Iran and Hezbollah’s influence within
Lebanon. In all, the U.S. must address the challenge of Hezbollah in Lebanon by
working with regional allies like Saudi Arabia to further bolster Lebanon’s security
forces while funding programs that develop Shiite political voices to Hezbollah.
Finally, the United States seeks a stable, unified Yemen that is no longer home to
transnational terrorist groups targeting Western or Saudi interests. However, whether or
not the U.S. and the broader international community have the will or means to achieve
this goal is an open question. Saudi Arabia endures much more of a direct impact from
Yemen’s current crisis than the U.S., including “Iran’s growing clout in the region; the
development of a Shia movement in Yemen; the import of a Shia–Sunni civil war into
Saudi Arabia; and wider border instabilities.” 278 The U.S. can at least act as an offshore
balancer to support Saudi Arabia and prevent Iran from developing a large pro-Iranian
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Shiite presence in Yemen that threatens the security of Saudi Arabia. The U.S. has already
been helping its GCC allies in the Saudi-led air campaign against the Houthi rebels in
Yemen, but such a strategy in the long-term may become an open-ended campaign that
does not create the stability that Yemen needs. 279
However, every form of security is likely to include some military aspect. Thus,
the U.S. should continue to support Hadi loyalists through continued intelligence support
to drive out Houthi rebels from strategic cities within Yemen. Also, redeploying Special
Forces to train troops and tribal groups loyal to Hadi, whether in Yemen or at regional
bases can help lead to the return of Hadi to Aden. Once the situation permits it, the U.S.
can redirect all aid, budgetary support, and diplomatic efforts to Hadi’s government in
Aden; encourage regional partners to do the same; and convene an academic symposium
of leading experts on Yemen to inform more effectively to policymakers a detailed
understanding of the country's politics required to build lasting stability. 280 The U.S. will
need to engage with its regional partners to develop a more coherent strategy to help end
the crisis in Yemen and stop Iran from expanding its influence near Saudi borders.
Another part of that balance strategy that could be implemented toward the crisis
in Yemen is the use of its naval ships in the strategic waterways of the Middle East. The
U.S. has already demonstrated its ability to act as an offshore balancer in Yemen by
increasing the Navy’s presence in the Gulf. In April, the U.S. sent seven warships,
including an aircraft carrier and a guided-missile cruiser, to show Iran its willingness to
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increase the stakes if antagonized and to “ensure the vital shipping lanes in the region
remain open and safe.” Additionally, the U.S. can use these air and sea capabilities to
continue its counterterrorism operations against al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, who
has looked to take advantage of the current crisis in Yemen.281
Because the airstrikes conducted mostly by Saudi Arabia have not produced any
significant result in helping end the violence in Yemen, the U.S. will likely have to resort
to other strategies to achieve its goals in Yemen. First, the United States should work
with its Gulf allies, the UN, and Iran to enact a ceasefire by all parties to provide some
level of stability in the conflict-driven state. To act as a mediator, the U.S. will likely
have to ease its support to the Saudi offensive to prevent America’s capacity to mediate
from eroding. Follow-on mechanisms that can help rebuild political and economic
entities in Yemen include supporting socially accountable civil society organizations that
are inclusive and considerate of Yemen’s ethnic and tribal divides and helping facilitate
political reform by working through a regional organization, similar to the GCC, to help
rebuild a federalist system that is more inclusive and considerate of tribal and ethnic
lines.282 Yemen’s current crisis will require an international and long-term approach,
however, implementing the steps listed above can provide the U.S. with some level of
success in weakening Iran’s growing influence in Yemen and help rebuild the security
situation in Yemen. In addition to implementing an offshore balance strategy, the U.S.
should continue to cooperate with its Gulf allies in strengthening their defense
capabilities such as missile defenses.
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Missile Defense Cooperation. To deal with Iran’s expanding conventional
military capabilities, America’s Gulf allies have looked to the U.S. for certain assurances
and support. At the recent Camp David Summit in May 2015 where President Obama
met with the leaders and high-level delegates from the GCC countries, President Obama
sought to reaffirm and deepen their close partnership. According to a joint statement
between the U.S. and the GCC states, the leaders “discussed how best to address regional
conflicts and defuse growing tensions,” and “pledged to further deepen U.S.-GCC
relations…in order to build an even stronger, enduring, and comprehensive strategic
partnership aimed at enhancing regional stability and prosperity.” 283 As a result of the
Summit, the U.S. and GCC states committed to enhancing ballistic missile defenses in the
region to counter Iran’s threatening air and missile defenses. Enhanced missile defenses
are an important element of displaying continued U.S. engagement with its GCC allies,
since Iran’s short and intermediate-range missiles put major population centers and
critical infrastructure on the Arabian Peninsula in range of Iranian strikes.
According to an annex to the U.S.-GCC Camp David Joint Statement, the U.S.
has also promised to “help conduct a study of GCC ballistic missile defense architecture
and offered technical assistance in the development of a GCC-wide Ballistic Missile
Early Warning System.”284 Assisting in developing a Gulf-wide missile defense systems
would be beneficial to all GCC states in addressing the enduring threat of Iran’s missile
capabilities. While Iran’s missile capabilities may not pose as serious of a threat
compared to those from Iranian proxy forces or its nuclear program, Iran can use its
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“conventionally armed missiles long-range rockets as terror weapons, and strike against
large area targets like petroleum export facilities and cities” that are within the borders of
American regional allies.285 Also, increasingly effective missile defenses can reassure
GCC allies against the missile threats posed by Iran’s proxy groups, whose missile
capabilities may become more of a problem in the future like they are today with Israel.
In addition to providing U.S. training and hardware for these capabilities, the United
States needs to enhance cooperation among its Gulf partners.
Despite the common threat of Iran, there is a feeling of distrust between some of
the GCC states because of past complications and historical events. To promote Gulf
cooperation on regional missile defense architecture, the United States can play a
supportive role. For instance, the U.S. can provide guidance in areas of information
sharing, including early warning tracking data, among the GCC countries by
recommending a sharing-based network. Such a network would lessen the distrust
between certain states and over time can become a strong tool to prevent Iranian missiles,
or those of its proxies, from targeting Gulf states.
In regards to a Gulf missile defense capability, the United States can look for
ways to improve decision-making processes for weapon releasability for additional
systems such as the Standard Missile and Aegis. 286 This can be done through the
authorization of defense articles or defense services aimed at improving the Gulf’s
ballistic missile capabilities. Finally, the U.S. can help its regional partners in developing
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a doctrine and concepts of operation that will allow coordination in knowing who shoots
down an incoming missile, when, and with how many interceptors. With warning times
as short as four minutes, a quick reactionary response requires significant pre-delegation,
which can be built through training, tabletop exercises, senior leader seminars, live-fire
tests, and demonstrations of interconnectivity. The United States has significant training
in the field of missile defense, and it should use this know-how to improve the defense
capabilities of its Gulf allies in order to deter and defend against future missile attacks
from Iran and its proxy forces in the Middle East.
Additional Support to Gulf Partners. Coinciding with support to improve the
Gulf’s missile defense capabilities aimed at deterring Iran, the United States can fund and
support other critical elements of its security cooperation effort with the GCC. For
instance, the U.S. should pursue is provide additional funding and support for Foreign
Military Sales (FMS) and International Military and Education Training (IMET)
programs to the Gulf states. These programs aimed at strengthening the capabilities of its
Gulf partners have demonstrated their effectiveness in the past.
For years, the U.S. has sold advanced military hardware to the Gulf to ensure that
strategic threats in Iran and Syria cannot intimidate U.S. regional allies. If the U.S. does
pursue this option, it will have to be careful in assuring anything given to the Gulf states
does not jeopardize America’s commitment to sustain Israel’s qualitative military
edge.287 The U.S. has long put restrictions on the types of weapons that American
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defense firms can sell to Arab nations. If a future administration approved F-35 sales to
the Gulf, which would probably be the UAE in the beginning, in three years or so, it
would allow Israel to have access to the advanced aircraft and its technology long enough
to maintain its military edge in the Middle East. In addition, the U.S. could make Saudi
Arabia and the UAE “major non-NATO” allies like Kuwait and Bahrain. Placing this
designation on a country grants a number of military advantages that are available only to
NATO allies, but falls short of a defense pact that the GCC is calling for.
Finally, the United States should continue to expand and alter, where necessary,
its IMET programs with the GCC. IMET provides training and education to students
from allied and friendly nations to facilitate the development of important professional
and personal relationships, which have proven to provide U.S. access and influence in a
critical sector of society that often plays a pivotal role in supporting, or transitioning to,
democratic governments.288 The trainings can focus on the areas of cooperation that were
detailed in the joint statement by the U.S. and GCC during the Camp David Summit.
However, IMET with Gulf partners also “should be updated to reflect the new strategic
imperatives in the Middle East, with a more explicit discussion of topics such as
diversifying the security services, police conduct, and civilian-military responses to
domestic threats.”289
To focus on countering the threats posed by Iran, the United States should
collaborate with its Gulf allies to establish large-scale exercises that emphasize
interoperability against asymmetric threats, such as terrorist or cyber-attacks, or other
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tactics associated with hybrid warfare. Additionally, the U.S. could assist the GCC
states to develop outside centers of excellence for training, educating, and exercise
activity that includes sending mixes of member country students and teams for outside
military training and education. Iran presents a strategic threat to U.S. regional allies in
several areas, therefore, strengthening allies’ capabilities to defend and deter against
Iranian aggression can enhance greater Gulf security. Furthering IMET programs can
produce longer-lasting ties and greater mutual respect between the U.S. and GCC than
can be afforded through joint exercises and in-theater cooperation.
In order to have these military assistance and training programs be an impactful
tool in America’s strategy in the Middle East, the U.S. needs to understand how these
programs can be successful levers of influence. To do so, conducting greater analysis of
how these programs best shape outcomes, including comparisons of particular packages
of hard equipment, trainings and assistance, would usefully inform how FMF packages
are designed. Without understanding how the military assistance and training investment
is directly shaping the decision-making by the militaries of U.S. Gulf allies and the
civilians with whom they serve, it is difficult to use such programs strategically to
advance U.S. national security interests.
Secondly, the U.S. should develop an assessment to evaluate the changing quality
and closeness of military to military (or civilian) relations between the U.S. and its
regional allies. This would enable policymakers to ensure the greatest return on the
military assistance and training investment, in part by building deep military-to-military
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relationships that are capable of enduring crises. 290 Conducting studies on these
initiatives aimed at supporting U.S. regional allies can provide Washington with a better
understanding of how to effectively utilize these programs to bolster Gulf security.
Other long-term opportunities to strengthen Middle East security and limit Iran’s
destabilizing foreign policy in the region include developing a comprehensive security
cooperation plan to shape the development of GCC naval forces and support innovative
thinking and progressive public-private relationships in the GCC defense sector.291 To
counter future aggression by Iran in the Gulf, the U.S. can sustain and deepen programs
and exercises aimed at improving GCC naval capabilities, such as the recent International
Mine Countermeasures Exercise.292 With Iran’s potential threat of mining the Strait of
Hormuz if tensions were to escalate in the Arabian Gulf, providing American-led training
in mine countermeasures and other naval tactics would display U.S. commitment to
regional security and allow the GCC to take greater responsibility in future regional
conflicts.
The above mentioned programs to fund and support the GCC military capabilities
can provide benefits for both the U.S. and its Gulf allies. The United States is already
cooperating with its regional partners through arms sales and training, but with the
growing strategic threat of Iran, these programs need to be analyzed, expanded and
directed at Iran’s destabilizing military posture. Funding for these programs should be
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driven by the 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), as recommended in the
President’s Fiscal Year 2016 Budget.293 The QDR states the U.S. will maintain a strong
military posture in the region, while placing “more emphasis on building the capacity of
our partners in order to complement our strong military presence in the region” working
closely with our allies “to enhance key multilateral capabilities, including integrated air
and missile defense, maritime security, and SOF.” 294 Combined with an offshore balance
approach, these military assistance and training programs can demonstrate America’s
commitment to establishing long-term security in the Gulf region.

Assuring U.S. Support for Israel’s Security
Despite Israel’s denouncement of the JCPOA, the U.S. will have to continue to
urge Israel to not take any unwarranted actions that could potentially dismantle the
nuclear agreement or cause additional destabilization in the Middle East. Israel was
reportedly close to attacking Iran during the nuclear talks, therefore, it is even more
important now for the U.S. to reassure its longtime ally that the deal will not weaken
Israel’s security.295
The U.S. should implement alliance-management efforts with the goal “to
encourage Israeli adaptation to [the Iran nuclear deal]” that U.S. believes prevents all
paths for Iran to develop a nuclear weapon.296 Developing such policies that include
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confidence-building measures should address Israel’s uncertainty over the efficacy of the
deal and thereby reduce the potential for unilateral Israeli actions.
For instance, it is recommended that the United States increase Israel’s deterrence
posture by cooperating on enhancing its missile defenses to defend against Iranian
missiles. The United States already maintains a strong defense relationship with Israel,
where it has cooperated with Israel on missile defense programs such as Iron Dome, the
David’s Sling Weapon System, and the Arrow Weapon System to create a multi-layered
architecture designed to protect the Israeli people from varying types of missile threats.
Washington should continue to appropriate funds to help improve the efficacy of these
systems in order to ensure their capability to intercept missiles or rockets from Iran or its
proxy groups, which may become more effective if Iran decides to further develop its
missile capabilities with its sanctions relief. The U.S. continues to show its support for a
robust Israeli missile defense architecture, as it has already allocated over half a billion
dollars the past two years toward U.S.-Israeli missile defense cooperation.297
Additionally, the United States could use non-military assurances to build
confidence in America’s commitment to Israeli security. An example being the
establishment of a regular high-level political and strategic dialogue with Israel to keep
its leaders informed on the implementation of the nuclear agreement and share mutual
concerns about broader regional security developments. This dialogue could entail how
the U.S. will use all tools, even the military option, to its disposal to catch Iran soon after
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a violation, if Iran were to do so. Then the U.S. would make it clear that it is prepared to
“snap back sanctions” if Tehran violates the JCPOA. 298
Even if these potential confidence-building and security measures are
implemented, the U.S. should be clear about its views on the actions that would
undermine its interests. Meaning, Washington should openly communicate that the
United States will only support military action against Iran as a last resort. The U.S. has
achieved what many thought would never happen in finalizing a deal with Tehran, thus,
any premature or unnecessary military action against Iran will likely cause more harm
than good to Middle East security. Because Israel is concerned over Iran’s commitment
to the JCPOA, the U.S. must be fully prepared to punish Iran if it were to violate the
agreement. To continue America’s pledge to Israeli security, implementing the options
listed above, while preventing Iran from cheating, can provide reliable assurances to the
U.S.-Israeli strategic partnership.

Conclusion
Iran is rising as a nation gaining more influence and standing in the Middle East,
while maintaining a nuclear program that is capable of producing material needed for
nuclear weapons. Because of Iran’s concealment of past nuclear activities, which some
believe has a military component to it, the United States has stood “ready to exercise all
options to make sure Iran does not build a nuclear weapon.”299
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During the Obama administration, the approach toward Iran has been pressure
tied with engagement. Since President Obama was inaugurated in 2009, his
administration has sought opportunities to engage with Iran through diplomacy. In a
video sent to the Iranian people two months after his inauguration, he stated, “[The U.S.
and Iran] have serious differences that have grown over time. My administration is now
committed to diplomacy that addresses the full range of issues before us, and to pursuing
constructive ties among the United States, Iran and the international community.” 300
Such diplomacy has resulted in a nuclear deal with Iran, which has put certain
limitations on Iran’s nuclear program. Finalizing the JCPOA does not end all of the
Middle East’s problems, but it is a step forward. However, the perception in Iran that
Tehran defeated the U.S. by maintaining a nuclear program will need to be addressed in
the near- and long-term. Countering Iran’s hegemonic ambitions, which may embolden
as a result of the nuclear deal, will be a part of the challenge to limit Iranian power and
preserve America’s regional interests in the Middle East.
To preserve a balance of power in the Middle East where no country’s military
capabilities overwhelming outmatch those of others in the region, the U.S. must develop
a strategy that includes burden-sharing with regional allies, along with enhancing the
military capabilities of those allies to strengthen their ability to secure the region. With
its Middle East allies, the U.S. must find ways to assure them that the nuclear deal will
not embolden Iran’s destabilizing activities and threaten their security. Whether that be
through foreign military sales and training or increasing U.S. naval presence in the Gulf,
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the U.S. should portray itself as a global power who is willing to protect its interests and
partners in the Middle East.
However, Washington will have to do so by adapting to the current global
environment. The U.S. should adopt the economy of force principle,301 as stated in the
U.S. Defense Strategy Review: “Whenever possible, [the U.S.] will develop innovative,
low-cost, and small-footprint approaches to achieve our security objectives, relying on
exercises, rotational presence, and advisory capabilities” with the warning that “with
reduced resources, thoughtful choices will need to be made regarding the location and
frequency of these operations.”302 It should be noted that a smaller footprint should
include a stronger U.S. maritime presence in the Gulf region to maintain America’s
commitment to its regional allies by countering violent extremism and destabilizing
threats. Developing the defense capabilities of Gulf allies, while implementing the role
as an offshore balancer, would allow the U.S. to actively engage in a Middle East conflict
only when the balance of power and American interests are in jeopardy, while gradually
building the militaries of its regional allies to form a balance to contain hostile forces like
Iran and its allies.
Placing more responsibility of regional security on America’s Middle East allies
has several gains. It will allow Middle East states to demonstrate their ability to protect
for themselves against state and non-state actors, which will provide long-term security
despite what America’s footprint is in the region. Also, more burden-sharing could
reduce the potential for an opponent to mount multiple small provocations designed to
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force the United States repeatedly into expensive operations to augment forwarddeployed forces, or what was known as the cheat-and-retreat tactic used by Saddam
Hussein during the 1990s.
In regards to Israel, the U.S. should continue to assure its commitment to
preserving the security of Israel. Israel is America’s most important strategic ally in the
Middle East and it should implement additional confidence-building and security
measures. Continuing military-to-military cooperation with Israel, specifically towards
Israeli’s missile defenses, and enhancing political and strategic dialogue between the U.S.
and Israel can demonstrate America’s continued commitment in maintaining a strong
alliance with Israel.
Throughout the Middle East, the United States should preserve its strategic
interests while looking for opportunities to improve the region’s crises in a post-JCPOA
world. The United States has demonstrated its national power in the past in the Middle
East through unilateral and multilateral actions and should continue to do so in an
evolving security environment that involves a more influential Iran and more
responsibility of GCC states. To counter Iran’s destabilizing regional goals and
influence, it is necessary for the United States to remind the theocracy in Tehran that the
U.S. remains committed to protecting its interests and allies in the Middle East to ensure
long-term regional security.
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